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Background: While much has been written in 
the evaluation literature on the theory of 
evaluations and on specific cases, there is still no 
comprehensive and easy to use indicator that can 
be used to hold organizations to the principles of 
effective evaluation, to score their quality in 
several areas, and to offer an immediate diagnostic 
for improvements. 
 
Purpose: The article offers an easy-to-use 
indicator for measuring whether organizational 
evaluation policies for government and non-
governmental organization spending actually 
protect the public interest in line with good 
governance and management principles or 
whether they serve, instead, to protect 
bureaucracies and hide wrongdoing under the 
cover of an “outside” evaluation. 
 
Setting: The primary focus of the piece is on 
international development evaluations but the 
author shows how the same indicator and model 
can be used for other government agencies as well 
as businesses, with modifications. 
 
Intervention: The article examines failures of 
evaluation systems in light of the principles for 
quality and shows how an indicator can be used to 
measure and prevent those failures. 
 
Research Design: The piece defines the 
principles of evaluation systems and accountability 
using both the frameworks of international 
agencies, themselves, and professional texts, 
places them in a model framework for effective 
evaluations, and then turns this framework into a 
set of questions to derive an indicator. 
 
Data Collection and Analysis: The article 
offers a sample detailed test of the indicator using 
the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) as a case study. Several other 
organizations of different types are also tested 
briefly to yield a variety of results on the quality of 
their evaluation systems. 
 
Findings: Use of this indicator on several 
organizations including those of the UN system, 
the EC, U.S.A.I.D., reveals that a number of 
governmental agencies and contractors (and 
particularly in the field of international 
development) are actually failing to protect the 
public interest and are using evaluation processes 
as tools to cover up abuses and mistakes and to 
advocate or advertise for more funding. 
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he lesson that I learned about the 
lengths government agencies would 
go to avoid public oversight was made 
clear in my first job with the executive 
branch of the U.S. government some 25 
years ago. Even before I began, my 
interview for the position centered on my 
earlier experiences working as an intern 
for a United States Senator who exercised 
some budgetary oversight over the agency, 
rather than on my skills or goals for the 
work. The reasoning for the intense 
questioning about my relationship with 
that Senator became clear when I began 
work. “We wanted to make sure that you 
wouldn’t report back to Congress on how 
we use public money,” the department 
deputy told me. Shortly thereafter, I 
witnessed lawbreaking by the agency and 
flagged it in my first report to my 
supervisors in the belief that they would 
be eager to assure their compliance with 
laws and improve use of their funds. The 
reality was just the opposite. The agency 
then classified the report as a “secret” 
document so that I couldn’t even read my 
own work and to ensure that the public 
would never see it. Then, they told me that 
if I ever reported what happened that they 
would act to assure an early end to my 
career in their agency. From hiring to 
routine work activities, I learned the 
lesson that the priority of government 
employees was not serving the public but 
on evading it by circumventing the 
democratic controls of the U.S. Congress 
and public laws. 
Now, with more than 25 years 
experience working with several U.S. 
government agencies as well as 
international organizations and foreign 
governments, ironically on projects that 
are designed to bring about “good 
governance” and to oppose “corruption” 
or to educate the public on their “rights,” I 
have become familiar with a wide range of 
devices that government agencies, 
implementing organizations, and 
businesses routinely use thwart oversight 
regulations and requirements for 
transparency and accountability in order 
to assure continued or expanded funding 
for their projects of dubious benefit. 
I have learned from colleagues that my 
experiences are not unique (Wenar, 2006; 
Dakin, 2003). The majority of evaluations 
in “development” projects in many 
international agencies follow a single 
formulaic result, guaranteed by an 
apparently manipulated (or 
subconsciously homogeneous) process to 
yield a typical conclusion: “The transfer of 
money or skills to ‘poor’ beneficiaries 
made them ‘richer’ or “better off” than 
they were without the transfer. The 
project should be continued and 
expanded.” Questions about comparative 
benefit, about long-term consequences, 
about dependency, interference in cultural 
systems, violations of international law, 
inconsistency with organizational 
mission, or about specific financial 
abuses, mismanagement or waste are 
routinely eliminated from their Terms of 
Reference or from their final reports as 
“outside of the scope” of the evaluation. 
More likely, these are replaced with 
requests to explain ‘delays’ in the transfer 
and the administrative structure for the 
transfer of resources alongside “lessons 
learned” and ideas for the “next phase” 
with the very same implementing agents. 
With evaluations like these, 
bureaucrats always win because the 
answer about whether transfer of money 
makes a recipient richer on receipt is 
always, “Yes.” With this logic, the result of 
an “evaluation” is pre-determined and no 
one is held to any measures of 
performance, with the shared 
understanding that asking for 
accountability would be “too difficult” or 
T
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would be “politically sensitive.” The real 
underlying goal is to turn evaluation into 
an advertisement for more money and 
power for the administrators, no matter 
how potentially harmful, how weak or 
unprofessional, how corrupt, how strongly 
in violation of international or local laws 
or development principles, or how self-
interested the transfer. In evaluations like 
these, where spending does not focus on 
the root causes of a problem to be treated, 
where evaluators are not empowered to 
stop or replace projects or redesign failing 
systems, or to hold anyone accountable 
for performance, the public that funds the 
projects and the intended “beneficiaries” 
who need solutions to problems rather 
than subsidies to treat symptoms, are 
always the losers. 
The above critique is simply firsthand 
evidence of several observers and it is easy 
for most agencies to wave off such 
criticisms as “subjective” or “uninformed.” 
To determine the reality would require a 
more objective tool that could both 
measure whether monitoring and 
evaluation systems fulfill their principles. 
Both critics and defenders currently lack 
such a tool that can test the critiques and 
constructively reveal exactly what is 
missing and what needs to be fixed to 
make an evaluation system work 
professionally. 
This article offers exactly that remedy 
and device; a measurement tool that takes 
the textbook professional standard of 
what an effective management and 
evaluation system is supposed to do and 
translates it into an easy to use indicator 
to hold organizations accountable. It does 
that by providing measures for assuring 
adherence to three simple categories of 
management control, accountability and 
transparency, along with professional 
protection of the evaluator in his/her 
evaluation role. This standardized critique 
scores evaluation systems using a total of 
25 questions. Each question reveals a part 
of the system that may be missing or weak 
and that needs to be fixed to assure 
credibility and effectiveness. 
The indicator offered in this article is a 
tool that government reformers, taxpayer 
advocates in the developed world, 
community activists in the developing 
world, public interest lawyers, and 
journalists can use to examine 
government systems that seem complex 
and difficult to understand, in order to 
measure their performance and turn those 
measures into clearly defined remedies. 
For professionals in development and in 
the evaluation field, who are more likely 
to defend the status quo than to call for 
actual measures of their work, this piece 
offers a reality check on public and 
professional expectations of their 
performance that can serve as a wake-up 
call. For students and scholars in 
management, it offers an additional 
framework for looking at management 
accountability and oversight systems. 
The importance of this indicator is 
reflected by a bit of irony. The author of 
this article has begun to establish the 
architecture for effective evaluation 
systems in the field of international 
development including invention of 
several new peer reviewed and published 
indicators for evaluators to use to hold 
public agencies accountable for results 
that were claimed to be hard to measure, 
but that detail inconsistency between 
project spending and international law 
and development missions. Yet, few of 
these indicators are being used because 
indicators have little or no impact without 
an effective system to use them. 
Moreover, there is a likelihood that 
evaluators who use them could be 
blacklisted and any use of indicators at all 
could be suppressed by agencies whose 
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performance is being measured. In 
offering change to developing nations, the 
developed nations have a responsibility to 
look at their own systems first to assure 
that they are actually modeling and 
support what they claim to be providing in 
their interventions overseas; a 
phenomenon that this author previously 
referred to as “Building Democracy…with 
Mirrors” (Lempert, 1996). 
Recent articles by this author have 
called for new organizations to monitor 
government agencies (Lempert, 2008a) 
and have offered indicators and 
benchmarks through which the public and 
organizations can hold international 
development actors accountable to 
international law and to their mission 
statements for their interventions. These 
“litmus-test” type indicators include an 
indicator for “sustainable development,” 
(Lempert and Nguyen, 2008) and other 
impact areas such as “democratization” 
(Lempert, 2008b) and “self-reliance” 
(freedom from donor “dependency” 
(Lempert, 2008c) among others 
(Lempert, 2009a, 2009b). The author has 
also begun to publish the ethics codes for 
professionals working in the field that 
protect public beneficiaries and legal 
requirements (Lempert, 1997). 
This piece goes one step further to 
provide a measure of the quality of the key 
control systems that must be in place, in 
monitoring and evaluation, and offers a 
scoring system to rate them based on the 
real world failures that currently thwart 
accountability. 
This article fits within the literature of 
evaluations, as well as of government 
structuring of good governance systems 
and how to measure and achieve them. It 
also provides a model framework of 
administration and control systems in 
international development and in general. 
For readers who work directly in applied 
settings in international development, the 
indicator offered and tested in this article 
can be used to hold donor countries and 
non-governmental organizations to the 
very standards they claim to be promoting 
overseas for good governance but for 
which they have yet to clearly define 
measures. 
The piece begins by defining the 
principles of evaluation systems and 
accountability as defined by international 
agencies, themselves, and by professional 
texts, so that these can be placed in an 
indicator that holds these organizations to 
their own standards. Following the 
description of principles is a brief 
summary of previous calls and attempts at 
designing an indicator, a section on the 
kinds of failures that now occur in the 
absence of any oversight indicator holding 
organizations to these principles, followed 
by a presentation of a new indicator that 
meets that goal. At the end of the article is 
an extremely detailed examination (a 
step-by-step introduction) to using the 
indicator on an organization like the 
United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), as well as on several other 
governmental and non-governmental 
organizations. 
Note that some readers may find the 
theoretical portion of this article a bit 
difficult since it combines work in various 
disciplines of management (public and 
private) and law. That, in itself, serves as a 
wake-up call to those who are currently 
involved in the field of evaluation, that 
they need professionals with full 
knowledge of these areas to build an 
effective evaluation system. Those readers 
who have difficulty with the theoretical 
material are advised to turn right to the 
indicator itself and to read the 25 
questions. These questions are relatively 
easy to apply even for non-experts since 
they apply the principles in practical ways. 
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Principles of Evaluations and 
Accountability 
 
The basic principles for effective 
evaluation systems are clear and a recent 
study by the World Bank’s Independent 
Evaluation Group defines these key areas 
as (World Bank & Mackay, 2007): 
 
 strong incentives for conducting 
M&E (monitoring and evaluation) 
and using the information and 
 structural arrangements to ensure 
objectivity and quality 
 
It seems to go without saying that a 
third prong in addition to incentives and 
objectivity is the existence of the standard 
management controls and reporting to 
provide quality information that 
evaluators can review (for which they 
need the “strong incentives” and 
“objectivity and quality” mentioned 
above). The functional skills and tasks 
that are essential can be found in any 
textbook of organizational management, 
though they are usually designed for 
private managers rather than adapted 
directly to public organizations. 
These three principles can be 
described more clearly as follows, with the 
skills and tasks placed before the World 
Bank’s two principles: 
 
1. Establishing a functioning 
management control system: 
Utilizing proper evaluation roles to 
provide information that the 
“owners” of the project need to 
review their spending. These are 
standard management control 
functions and reporting that 
provide quality information for 
review. 
2. Assuring incentives for 
transparency and accountability of 
the evaluation so that information 
reaching the “owners” is objective 
and appropriate: The approach to 
ensuring strong incentives for 
conducting evaluations generally 
requires some kind of independent, 
enforceable, watchdog function 
over the evaluations, to protect the 
“owners” of the project; and 
3. Protection of professionalism and 
political insulation of evaluations: 
These are the structural 
arrangements to ensure objectivity 
and quality of professionals in their 
evaluation roles. 
 
The basic principles and measures of 
quality in each of these three categories 
are also relatively well known, though 
they may never have been collected and 
presented together for measuring the 
quality of evaluation systems. They can be 
elaborated further, below. 
 
Principles of a Functioning 
Management Control System: 
Measurement for Managerial 
Control 
 
It is interesting that while there are 
standard evaluation frameworks in fields 
like international development with a 
recurring set of concerns—efficiency, 
efficacy, relevance, quality of design, 
overall value, sustainability, etc.—these 
are not directly linked with management 
literature to make it clear what specific 
systems need to be in place to collect the 
information and perform the functions 
that are to be evaluated. (The standard 
frameworks of the UNDP and the 
European Commission can be found easily 
at: UNDP Evaluations Office, 2002, 
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Guidelines for Outcome Evaluators, p. 10; 
Europeaid project evaluations, 2007). If 
the professionals who are supposed to be 
making judgments about efficiency 
(usually accountants), design (technical 
professionals), relevance (legal experts 
and business strategists), and so on, are 
not the appropriate personnel for the 
specific measures required at each step, 
the determinations they make will be 
entirely inconsistent with the professional 
needs of the organization. While 
businesses are not likely to make this 
mistake given their incentives, there is 
often no link at all between the types of 
measures and the types of professionals 
needed to make those judgments in 
development organizations, and one 
evaluator with only one profession may be 
making decisions in several fields where 
he or she has no training. 
Standard management textbooks to 
train business and public managers for 
effective measurement and control of 
their organizations are clear in defining 
the kinds of systems that need to be in 
place for an organization to run efficiently 
and for it to be subject to controls that 
assure its objectives are best achieved. 
(See, for example, the standard textbooks 
in “Managerial Accounting” (Garrison, 
Noreen & Brewer, 2005) and in 
“Accounting for Management Control” 
(Emmanuel, Merchant, & Otley, 1990). 
Table 1, Principle I, takes the set of 
evaluation concerns required by 
development organizations like the UNDP 
and the EC (referenced above) and places 
them next to the standard management 
functions and departments that routinely 
measure these concerns as a way to 
distinguish the specific professional 
functions that are required in an effective 
management control system. This table 
may seem foreboding at first, since it 
takes a massive amount of information 
and tries to summarize and short-cut it, 
but it is an easy way of presenting and 
seeing a large volume of information to 
see the parallel needs of different types of 
organizations to hire specific 
professionals for particular kinds of 
evaluation measures. 
The table compares three different 
kinds of organizations: international 
development organizations (the first two 
rows), businesses (the third and fourth 
rows) and government and civil society 
organizations (the fifth and sixth rows). In 
fact, development organizations are just 
one type of government and civil society 
organization and the material in the fifth 
and sixth rows expands in detail on the 
functions and specific information needs 
for effective monitoring in international 
development organizations as well as for 
any government or civic organization 
spending. Those who are most familiar 
with business or government 
organizations can start in those sections 
and look at the comparisons. Overall, the 
final conclusion of the table as to the 
specific professionals needed for different 
parts of the flow chart of activities (the 
required oversight and measurement 
functions in organizations) is presented in 
the final row at the bottom. 
To walk through the table, those who 
are familiar with the evaluation measures 
for development organizations should 
start with the second row as a way of 
understanding how the first and second 
rows work together. This row (Evaluation 
Categories/Questions of UN/EC/USAID 
Systems) presents the series of questions 
and information sought by development 
organizations in evaluations. 
Look next at the top row. The top row 
does is takes the standard questions for 
evaluations in development organizations 
from the second row and shows that these 
questions actually follow the flow of 
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activities that a development organization 
is supposed to follow in designing and 
managing its projects. Each evaluation 
question set should be and is linked to a 
specific activity or function that is 
presented in the first row. The arrows 
show that these functions are linked in a 
process or flow and that the entire process 
is really part of a feedback loop. Ideally, 
information from an evaluation leads to a 
check on the organization’s mission and to 
new designs and project innovations. 
Note that no matter what kind of 
organization to be monitored, evaluations 
regularly correspond to seven different 
and independent lower management 
systems in the cycle of operations of an 
organization. These range from strategic 
planning and mission setting and 
protecting to design and innovation, 
purchasing of inputs, production of 
outputs, outcome results, financial and 
business planning for sustainability and 
growth, and research and development. 
Depending on the type of organization, 
they have different names, but the concept 
of each stage is the same. Looking down 
the columns at the different organizations 
is useful as a check, particularly on public 
organizations, on the professional role of 
each of these stages. 
Overall, the rows describe the kind of 
information that is essential to be 
routinely collected and then made 
available to evaluators for the evaluation 
to have any real meaning or purpose. 
The final row of the table makes it 
clear that each of these sub-systems is not 
only distinct but that successful 
evaluation of organizational performance 
requires specific professional skills to 
match the needs of each of these sub-
systems. Asking evaluators to review 
systems for which they lack the wrong 
professional expertise (a common 
problem in evaluations that assume one 
evaluator can do everything), providing 
too little time or resources for effective 
oversight, or simply asking evaluators to 
review systems that do not even exist as 
distinct in the organization are clear signs 
of evaluation failure. Reading across the 
rows it is easy to see that the necessary 
expertise includes business planning and 
law, managerial accounting (different 
from cost efficiency accounting though 
most development organizations don’t 
recognize it), auditing and personnel 
auditing, cost accounting (quite different 
from auditing, though most development 
organizations don’t recognize it), public 
accountability/ law, financial investment, 
and social science, in addition to 
sustainable development training and 
other project technical skills. 
Understanding this alone is the key to 
understanding what constitutes quality 
and why most measurement systems fail 
at even this most basic step of 
professionalism. It is easy to start with 
this set of principles of what an evaluation 
needs to do and what measures and 
systems need to be in place, as a very 
quick means of determining whether the 
evaluation system is meaningful or not. 
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Preliminary Measures Needed 
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Accountable 
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Principles of Transparency and 
Accountability of the Evaluation 
Role, Itself  
 
There is plenty of literature on the legal 
principles of transparency and 
accountability, alongside the literature of 
management control. In legal doctrine, 
transparency and accountability are parts 
of (management) control and “agency,” 
described by relations of “principal and 
agent” or “master and servant.” 
The basic principle is simply that the 
decision-maker (in the case of public 
organizations, the “taxpayer” public; in 
the case of NGOs, the citizens who 
donate) must be assured that it receives 
all of the information it needs in the form 
that makes it useful. In the case of 
international development, where there 
are recipients of aid, laws also define the 
rights of “third party beneficiaries” (the 
aid recipients who are members of the 
public in the developing country) as that 
of being owed “duties of care,” who also 
have rights to information and oversight. 
The duty of care is the duty to provide 
information to these citizens who receive 
the services or could be harmed by other 
actions taken by the project. The project 
management is the agent (the government 
agency or the non-governmental 
implementing agency) and their agents 
are the people they hire for technical work 
(professionals and partner implementing 
agents). Each of these four types of actors 
has different roles and responsibilities in 
an accountable and transparent 
management and evaluation system. 
An accountable management control 
system in international development add 
two groups of actors, the “taxpayer” public 
and the aid recipients in the developing 
country, to the system of oversight in a 
private business activity (the “taxpayer” 
public and the aid recipients in the 
developing country), and one group to the 
system of oversight ordinarily find in 
domestic public administration (the aid 
recipients in the developing country). In a 
shareholder owned corporation where the 
owners and managers are different, the 
shareholders/owners take the place of the 
“taxpayer” public, and government takes 
the place of the community in protecting 
against any harms of business activity, 
with the other principles the same. These 
two groups (the “taxpayer” public and the 
aid recipients) are the real decision-
makers, expected to have the power of 
oversight in international development 
projects. Their role is that of watchdogs 
and they make the decisions on spending 
and on programs. 
Within the project management, in the 
implementing agency and among the 
professionals and partner implementing 
agents they hire (including for 
evaluations) the principles for assuring 
accountable and effective oversight are 
simple and clear. 
 
 Management (i.e., the control 
agency of the evaluation system on 
behalf of the taxpayer public and 
aid recipients in international 
development; on behalf of 
shareholders/owners in a business) 
must be completely separate from 
the project/agency offices under 
review without conflicts of interest 
(i.e., not belonging to same union, 
responding to another common 
manager above them, and having 
no shared interest in project 
funding or continuation or 
favorable review) and they must 
answer to higher authority with 
real power, including budgetary 
control or the power of 
removal/firing rather than simply 
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one in name that has actually 
delegated power back to the 
managers. 
 Evaluations must feed into a 
system with performance based 
incentives from the design to the 
review stage of operations, such 
that results of the evaluation lead 
to rewarding and punishing specific 
employees and offices on the basis 
of performance. These measures of 
performance need to be clearly 
defined so that punishments and 
rewards have a rational basis 
linked with organizational 
objectives. 
 
Table 2, Principle II, helps to generate 
a list of the measures and safeguards that 
an evaluation system needs to ensure 
accountability and transparency for 
different actors in different roles (the 
third column of the table). This list can 
then be used to test the quality of an 
evaluation system. 
Though the table may seem packed 
with information, it is also simple to 
follow. The left column lists the four types 
of actors, identified above, who are the 
different stakeholder-managers of an 
evaluation and who have legal obligations 
on public spending for international 
development projects. The second column 
describes their general role in assuring 
effective, accountable, transparent 
oversight. Note that for a “Government 
implementing Agency” the roles are 
exactly that list of functions that were 
listed in the previous table, Principle I. 
The key detail information is in the third 
column, defining exactly who (what 
specific professionals in what kinds of 
organizations) can assure performance of 
the role and how they do it. This column 
describes the specific duties of care as well 
as the specific mechanisms that need to be 
functioning in order to assure information 
transparency and accountability related to 
the function of evaluations. Finally, the 
fourth column describes what happens 
when a specific part of the oversight and 
control system fails, as a way to help 
diagnose the origin of problems in a co-
opted or corrupted evaluation system. 
For those who want a summary of the 
information, rather than follow all of the 
detail, the key general ideas that can be 
summarized from the table and applied 
directly for international development 
projects (with analogies to other public 
projects and to business for those who 
wish to make other uses of the table) are 
that: 
 
 The “Taxpayer” Public and Aid 
Beneficiaries must be able to use 
the information that evaluations 
provide as a real control 
mechanism and not for just an 
information network or 
“communities of practice” among 
the implementers; 
 Some controlling authority directed 
by the “Taxpayer” Public and Aid 
Beneficiaries must set proper 
timing and funding for the 
evaluations, based on principles of 
cost/benefit (matching the costs of 
the evaluation to the benefits to the 
Beneficiaries), so that the tasks of 
review are regular and 
appropriately funded; and 
 The Information system, itself, 
must meet certain quality 
standards so that useful and clear 
information reaches all of the 









Principle II: Transparency and Accountability of the Evaluation 
 
Stakeholder Interest group 
in the evaluation with 
responsibility for 
managerial control and 
oversight (with Legal Term 
to describe them) 
Role (Building on Principle I Table) Who Assures Accountability to the Beneficiaries and Public 
Contributors and How 
Implications of failure of this system 
Public beneficiaries of the 
aid (“Third Party 
Beneficiaries” owed a “Duty 
of Care”) 
Watchdog role/ Direct participation 
and ability to assure the project is 
transparent and accountable 
Who: Requires a protected civil society (NGO and Media) with 
investigatory powers and public accountability of civil 
society through public participatory court and judicial 
processes. 
How: Direct and transparent oversight of the government 
donor, of the implementing partners and of the 
government body acting on behalf of the public.  
 
If this system is absent or weak, none of the 
M&E by the stakeholder implementing 
agents will improve or be held to standards 
and there is a likelihood of abuse, 
corruption, and subversion of the stated 
agenda.  
Public contributors to the 
donor (taxpayers or 
contributors) – (The 
“Master” controlling the 
“Servant” “Agency”) 
Watchdog role/ Direct participation 
and ability to assure the project is 
transparent and accountable 
 
Who: Requires a Parliamentary our outside watchdog agency 
with investigatory powers and public accountability. 
Requires a protected civil society (NGO and Media) with 
investigatory powers and public accountability of civil 
society through public participatory court and judicial 
processes.  
How: Independent evaluation findings communicated directly 
to the public through standards and benchmarks, with 
potential to change funding.  
Same as above 
Government implementing 
agency with the power to 
hire specialists (following 
the functions of the previous 
table) – (The Agency) 
 
1) Protecting Organizational Mission 
and Strategic Planning to fulfill 
it;  
a) Interventions screened to assure 
most strategic promotion of the 
mission: Fulfillment of a specific 
accountable public function to 
protect and promote 
development of a resource in a 
sustainable way on behalf of the 
public beneficiaries and 
contributors. 
b) Advocacy for more projects on the 
basis of innovations and 
measures 
Who: - High Level Management Trained in Strategic Planning 
with regular exercises;  
How: - Organizational Management reviews;  
Who: - Governance and Legal Review to assure accountability 
and implementation of government functions  
How: Review and screening of all interventions to assure 
compliance with the mission and comparative/ strategic 
advantage 
The organization becomes a tool of the 
donors and its own bureaucrats, setting an 
agenda and choosing projects that do not 
advance its mission on behalf of the public 
and substituting hidden agendas or 
choosing interventions randomly and 
inefficiently with weak results at best. 
 2) Professional Project Design and of 
Management Systems for 
Implementation:  
Who: Professional Experts in a Unit for Research and 
Development of interventions or coming from the outside. 
(Measures include those listed in the table on the Activity 
cycle of organizations.) 
Project design and standard setting offer 
no real measures for the evaluation that 
have a professional basis and advocacy is 
on the basis of conservatism and hidden 
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How: Support should be 5% of spending on the project and in 
addition to any project manager/ administrator 
agendas rather than results, resulting in 
failures and waste. 
 3) Cost Control 
a) Cost Accounting / Bookkeeping in 
Procurement Systems and  
b) Independent Watchdog Audit for 
Efficiency of Inputs 
Who: - Internal procurement systems and personnel systems; 
Who: an independent comptroller/ auditor doing spot checks 
for waste  
How: - External, independent Auditing and accounting of 
inputs (should be 2% of spending) by  
Theft and waste 
 4) Managerial Accounting for 
Efficiency of Outputs for 
Measurable Levels of Technical 
Outputs (Quality per unit cost) 
Who: Key Function of Independent Evaluators in a Technical 
Area, but relies on professional project reporting and data 
collection from the design phase. 
Who: Upper level management must understand skills of 
Managerial Accounting  
How: assure that project designers understand quality 
measures and have offered real benchmarks of output 
value that are quantitative and scored if qualitative, so that 
there are measures of technical value per unit of spending 
Waste and degradation of interventions 
and a result where advocacy is on the basis 
of connections, lobbying, politics, and 
sales/marketing rather than results 
 5) Measuring Outcomes in 
Professional fields and in 
additional categories of impacts 
(social, cultural, resources) – a 
Managerial accounting role 
linked to Step 2) 
Who: Public Watchdog role in coordination with objective 
evaluators offering information and exerting incentives on 
management to achieve high standards through: 
How: Professional measure of changes in behaviors, relative 
powers, and shifts of assets to promote sustainable human 
development balances, including the measures of 
unintended effects scaled for an overall measure of 
benefit/ performance (and losses) to individuals/ the 
system per unit of spending 
If unintended outcomes are hidden or not 
measured (particularly long-term impacts/ 
externalities), if the wrong measures are 
substituted for real development goals, or 
if measures are poor or false, projects may 
be doing more harm than good  
 6) Strategic Planning for 
sustainability/ maintenance/ 
growth: - 
- Systems Analysis,  
- Financial systems analysis of public 
spending,  
- Social marketing systems analysis, -  
- Innovation investment analyst 
Who: Upper Management 
How: - Benefit evaluation and tax/donation policy linking 
contributions to benefits 
- Social marketing to promote replication 
Projects are just quick fixes that are 
treating symptoms and may be creating 
dependency. 
 7) Research and Development  Who: Social science professionals accountable to professional 
standards and the public through: 
How: Analysis to lead to design of improved indicators and 
better interventions through scientific methodology like 
control groups (should be 5% of project spending) 
Project design and standard setting offer 
no real measures for the evaluation that 
have a professional basis and advocacy is 
on the basis of conservatism and hidden 





contractors or Agents of the 
Agents) 
 
Professional Expertise: Outside 
professionals in specific categories 
can fill the roles in the government 
organization in the 7 categories above 
with the role of meeting professional 
standards in these roles and to 
advocate for more work on the basis 
of professional quality. 
 
Who: Internal systems of professionals similar to those in 
government organizations (7 categories above) as well as 
through professional organizations and the public. 
How: - Maintenance and protection of professional standards 
and objectivity of work through ethics codes, unionization, 
legal protection, certification, professional peer review, 
and contracting procedures that assure these in several 
different ways such as direct contact and accountability to 
beneficiaries and independent oversight bodies 
Collusion occurs between the agency being 
evaluated and the evaluator, leading to a 
situation where results are 
politicized/pressured/falsified causing the 
implementation or evaluation process to 
serve only as a rubber stamp or 
advertisement for previous decisions and 
hidden agendas 
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Principle for Protecting the 
Professionalism and Objectivity of 
the Evaluators 
 
The final principle for assuring effective 
managerial oversight and evaluations—
that of protecting the professionals who 
perform the evaluation, measurement and 
reporting functions—is the simplest one to 
state, though possibly the hardest one to 
implement. Protecting the 
professionalism and objectivity of the 
work of evaluators requires a similar set of 
safeguards to those for protecting the 
quality of work of any professional. 
Selection procedures must meet 
professional standards that adequately 
test the range of skills needed, the 
professional should meet certain 
standards of certification, and the 
conditions of work must protect the 
freedom and objectivity of the 
professional by contract, contract 
enforcement, and conditions. 
Professionalism requires looking at the 
cycle of the evaluator’s work and assuring 
that there are protections at every step, 
from hiring to certification, to setting the 
standards and conditions of the work, to 
protecting against pressures of firing 
without cause, to assuring appropriate 
measurement of performance and 
rehiring without politicization. Though 
the different steps and stages that require 
protection are well recognized, the 
standards for achieving this and the 
measure of quality are continually revised 
based on understandings of legal 
mechanisms for protecting 
professionalism. Some of these can be 
listed in an indicator to measure at least 




Previous Attempts to Design an Indicator 
for Measuring the Quality of Evaluation 
Systems. Though there seems to be 
overall agreement among those who write 
about evaluation policy that, “It is a good 
idea to regularly monitor and evaluate the 
way the M&E system has developed and 
how well it is performing” (World Bank & 
MacKay, 2007, p. 2), most attempts to 
design a monitoring tool to test the quality 
of evaluation systems fall short. Many 
authors define the process and categories 
to examine, but fail to focus on the 
specific, substantive needs of a working 
system. None offer a clear overall 
indicator, though some do focus on how to 
measure performance of individual sub-
systems with some guidelines that fit the 
three principles above. 
 
General Attempts to Design an Indicator 
for Evaluation Systems. Some analysts of 
evaluation systems have described the 
range of “types” of monitoring and 
evaluation systems in different categories 
of approaches, with strengths and 
weaknesses as ways of classifying them 
and moving towards a diagnostic, but 
without offering a useful indicator. 
House (1978), for example, has 
identified a number of types of 
evaluations, including 
  
 politically controlled evaluations to 
promote an agenda 
 public relations evaluations to 
advertise for funds 
 research evaluations 
 objective based evaluations 
 decision oriented evaluations (for 
managers); and 
 accountability for performance, 








Yet, identification does not help to 
determine whether the common 
requirements that apply to all types of 
evaluations are being met, and labeling 
evaluations may not be that useful. In fact, 
no governmental evaluation system (and 
probably no business or civil society 
organization evaluation, either) should 
ever be a public relations evaluation or a 
politically controlled evaluation. These 
descriptions are really descriptions of 
failures of the evaluation system and its 
subject to capture for different reasons. A 
good indicator should actually be able to 
distinguish and label evaluations based on 
weaknesses. House does not provide one. 
Many different articles and books 
describe the “steps” (considerations and 
political processes) involved in building 
an evaluation system, while never 
defining what exactly needs to be built 
and how its quality is measured. Among 
the 7 or 8 or 10 steps, experts usually 
suggest actions like “doing a preliminary 
study” and “developing indicators” after 
“agreeing on what needs to be measured” 
but not describing how to protect the 
system of measurement or actually 
offering such indicators. (cf., Kusak & 
Rist, 2001). 
Mackay promotes the idea of a 
diagnostic and offers a list of 8 areas to 
consider, but does not define the key 
principles of success that could be used 
for scoring in such an indicator. He 
suggests reviewing the history, the 
departments, and the process and even 
whether or not there is “donor support” 
(which seems to reverse the principle of 
accountability rather than implement it). 
Rather than offer a way to evaluate an 
evaluation system, with a list of key 
requirements of that system, he offers 
“success factors.” Among the 14 elements 
he notes are “substantive government 
demand” and whether there is a 
“diagnosis of existing M&E as a first step” 
as well as whether an evaluation is 
“centrally driven by a capable Ministry.” 
This is a process oriented approach that 
potentially needs to an endless loop 
without defining the principles or 
substance. It also appears to be a self-
serving guarantee for the need to hire 
consultants because there is no way that 
citizens or consultants can use the 
process, themselves (World Bank & 
MacKay, 2007). 
The typical book on “building 
capacity” of evaluation systems similarly 
ends with suggestions for the “need to 
educate” for routine and quality, but 
without defining specific standards and 
without offering measures (Boyle & 
Lemaire, 1999). 
While there are several organizations 
that are seeking to coordinate standards 
in specific fields for measurement of 
different kinds of government services, 
they have also failed to define systems of 
accountable evaluations or to provide 
standards for measures. Among these are: 
the International Development Evaluation 
Association: http://www.ideas-int.org/, 
and the International Organization for 
Cooperation in Evaluation (IOCE): 
http://internationalevaluation.com/index
.shtml, including its partner the American 
Evaluation Association/American Journal 
of Evaluation, and other national 
associations. 
 
Indicators of Evaluation Quality for a 
Functioning Management Control 
System: to Achieve Measurement for 
Managerial Control. There seems to be 
the only indicator currently available to 
measure whether evaluation systems fit 
overall managerial control needs and it is 
not particularly streamlined to identify 
the 7 different management control 
functions that are outlined in the table, 
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above for Principle I. A team of evaluators 
has developed a sophisticated 
“evaluability” indicator that rates the 
performance of an organization in 
professionalizing systems of measurement 
that evaluators can use (Poate et al., 
2000). They ask whether an organization 
has sufficiently clarified its objectives and 
its measurements such that clear 
measurements are even possible. This is 
an important part of examining the 
evaluation process. However, it is only 
one part. Even if a project is “evaluable,” 
the evaluation may be irrelevant if its 
results do not feed back into management, 
if the evaluation is no transparent, or if 
the evaluator is pressured and the process 
is corrupted.  
 
Indicators of Evaluation Quality for 
Accountability and Transparency. 
Various governance indicators already 
exist in the field of “democratization” 
though they are not particularly 
applicable to evaluations. Among them 
are those that include shadow measures of 
accountability of organizations or that 
seek to measure attributes like public 
voice or government “effectiveness.” None 
of the specific indicators offer enough 
detail to measure the effectiveness of 
different watchdog and beneficiary roles 
for holding public and private 
bureaucracies accountable. The author 
has discussed some of these measures in 
an article on democratization indicators 
that can be summarized briefly as follows 
(Lempert, 2008b). 
Freedom House’s “national democratic 
governance” category, among its measures 
of “freedom,” for example, implies that it 
measures accountability of government 
bureaucracies along with overall 
separation of powers. However, Freedom 
House’s scoring system does not list 
attributes of a system that characterize 
accountability. Instead, scoring is based 
on subjective indicators in categories of 
performance (Freedom House, 2008, p. 
3). The indicator scores are based on 
broad, subjective questions such as, “Does 
a competent and professional civil service 
function according to democratic 
standards and practices?” without listing 
those standards. 
The World Bank’s governance 
standards are also subjective, relying on 
surveys of concepts like “voice and 
accountability,” asking questions like: 
“How much do you trust the Parliament?” 
and “How satisfied are you with the way 
democracy works in your country” and 
with “Free and fair elections” (Kaufman, 
Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2007, p. 44). This is 
an indicator of perceptions, not of the 
quality of mechanics of an evaluation 
system. 
A third organization, Citizen Report 
Card, offers a citizen watchdog tool as an 
example of the citizen oversight role and 
how it can be made effective, but the 
Report Card cannot be used as an 
indicator. Citizen Report Card bases its 
concept of accountability on whether on 
organization relies on user surveys but not 
on whether it shares information with the 




Indicators of Systems for Protecting the 
Professionalism and Objectivity of the 
Evaluators. There do not appear to be any 
current indicators in this area. 
 
The Wrong Focus. The problem of failed 
evaluation systems, particularly in 
governance, appears widespread and 
many of the harms are easy to spot. 
Unfortunately, while the three principles 
for quality evaluation systems are simple 
and not so difficult to measure or 
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estimate, many evaluation systems avoid 
even the basics. 
Failure occurs at all three levels: lack 
of overall management control systems in 
the organization to ensure real 
evaluations; the lack of an effective public 
watchdog role to oversee or improve the 
process on behalf of beneficiaries and 
taxpayer contributors, and the lack of 
professional safeguards of the evaluator’s 
independence and professionalism. 
The information presented thus far in 
this article can be summarized as follows, 
with clear implications for where failures 
occur. For organizational evaluations to 
be effective there need to be roughly 8 to 
11 levels or “systems” that are working, 
depending on how one counts (seven 
different management systems within the 
organization that were listed in the first 
table, and up to four other systems of 
accountability to the four different groups 
of stakeholders listed in the second table, 
above). Each of these systems requires a 
specific kind of expertise. Despite this 
need for multiple professional skills, 
international donor assistance project 
evaluations often rely only on one 
evaluator to serve all of these multiple 
interests and trying to assure their 
effectiveness, with a minimum of funding! 
Moreover, the basic systems on which 
evaluators need to rely for information, 
may not even exist. In most organizations, 
audit and accounting systems usually exist 
in a basic form, but the lack of other 
management systems for other necessary 
functions means that evaluations are 
already severely handicapped before they 
begin. 
Where Principle I is undermined and 
internal systems to routinely collect and 
process information that supports their 
functions are missing, evaluations are 
often transformed into exercises in fiction 
writing with the goal of creating measures 
after the fact, where none exist, under 
pressure to justify a project. Lack of 
standardization—making every project an 
independent case study without any 
measures under the assumption that 
every project is “unique” or incomparable 
or that measures are “too difficult to 
create” (assertions that are rarely made 
subject to professional challenges)—
undermines the concept of management 
control and evaluation. With no basic data 
or systems to review, evaluators are often 
pressured to just keep their eyes closed to 
the absence of information and systems 
and to just assume good faith and 
appropriate functioning even though the 
failures are evidence that the opposite is 
true. 
Where Principle II is overridden and 
there is no effective watchdog role and 
procedures for accountability, evaluations 
often become advertisements for 
bureaucrats and the people they hire. This 
reverses the relationship of master 
(taxpayer public, aid beneficiaries, and 
their designated managers) and servants 
(implementing agents); with the servants 
setting the rules and evaluating 
themselves; declaring that they have done 
an excellent job and deserve higher pay. 
Where Principle III is overridden and 
professionalism lacks safeguards, 
evaluators are pushed towards a role of 
propagandists and fundraisers. 
While some evaluation systems are 
unavoidably weak as a virtue of 
organizations being small and unable to 
hire a full range of qualified professionals 
for an entire array of measures and 
managerial functions, the failure in larger 
organizations, and particularly in 
government systems, is hard to excuse. In 
larger organizations where failures occur, 
they are often the result of the weakening 
the evaluation process by design; 
increasingly through sophisticated 
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measures to corrupt, distort, and falsify 
any attempts at oversight and 
accountability. Corrupted evaluation 
systems may have any one or more of 
these characteristics: 
 
 Hiring process and structuring of 
the evaluations, that deliberately 
under-fund or under-represent the 
necessary expertise (the several 
different professional skills) that 
are necessary to ask appropriate 
questions, to ferret out or 
reconstruct key data, and to 
appropriately apply the different 
types of professional analyses that 
are required. 
 Transference to the private sector 
of public sector functions of 
evaluators in order to enable 
bureaucrats to directly (and 
intentionally) strip evaluators of 
public protections (free speech; 
whistle blowing; public and legal 
reporting) that they would have if 
they were working directly for 
government; 
 Monitoring and pressuring of 
evaluators in ways that impede 
their ability to freely exercise their 
professional responsibilities, 
sometimes under the 
rationalization that asking the right 
questions is “an insult” to those 
whose failures (or corruption) are 
being exposed. 
 Direct suppression, falsification or 
replacement of honest and 
objective evaluations; 
 Firing, blacklisting, or harassment 
of professionals 
 Anti-Fraud or Ombudsman 
agencies that lack real power to 
hold anyone accountable or are 
tasked only to target outsiders or 
embezzlement, not protection of 
projects and the bureaucracy; and 
 Anti-fraud or hotline offices that 
are within the same agency, part of 
the same union, in the same 
buildings, etc. as staff being 
evaluated (an example of the 
absence of independent systems 
that are legally enforceable or 
backed by any public or 
professional bodies to protect the 
process). 
 
In fact, it is possible to use a relatively 
simple indicator to separate failures from 
successful projects simply by looking at 
whether the fundamental principles are 
appropriately measured and incorporated 
into a system of objectives. 
 
An Indicator to Measure Effective 
Evaluation Systems. The indicator 
presented below be can used easily, even 
by non-experts, as a litmus test of the 
quality of an evaluation system, 
differentiating quickly between effective 
and ineffective (or hidden agenda, 
“propagandistic”) evaluation approaches,. 
By asking a set of 25 “Yes or No” 
questions in three different performance 
areas, tallying up the results in each of the 
three areas, then reading the final 
determination on a special grid (see 
“Scoring Table”), it is easy to score the 
relative quality of any evaluation system 
and reveal its weaknesses. 
The three categories of performance, 
that can each be scored, follow the three 
Principles described in the first part of 
this article. 
 
I. Fulfillment of the functions of a 
management control system: 
Utilizing proper evaluation roles 
(divided into two scoring 
categories) (11 questions); 
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II. Quality of transparency and 
accountability of the evaluation: 
Whether the system effectively 
serves as a management watchdog 
(for non-governmental 
organizations) and government 
watchdog and public protector (for 
both governmental and non-
governmental organizations) (6 
questions); and 
III. Ability to safeguard 
professionalism and politically 
insulate evaluations from outside 
pressures and conflicts of interest 
(8 questions). 
 
While this indicator is designed for use 
in the most complex type of 
organizations—international donor 
assistance—it can also be used on 
domestic government agencies, private 
businesses and civil society organizations 
(with some modifications). Those who 
wish to use the indicator on business 
organizations should note that the 
approach should b slightly different on the 
second category of questions, relating to 
transparency and accountability, where 
there are different stakeholder groups 
(corporate shareholders as well as the 
overall public). To measure the quality of 
a business or civil society in responding to 
its shareholders or members, simply 
inserts this category in the category of 
“beneficiaries” and ask the same set of 
questions in Category II, a second time. 
To see whether a business or civil society 
organization is accountable internally (to 
its shareholders and members) and 
externally, to the public that charters 
business and non-governmental 
organizations to operate and that has the 
power to regulate them, the same 
questions must be asked again from the 
perspective of citizens as beneficiaries. In 
other words, there is a need to score 
accountability to shareholders, first, then 
to score accountability to the public, 
second, to measure whether the 
evaluation systems are working effectively 
to hold the organizations accountable to 
the public for issues of concern to the 
public, as well. 
Before beginning the scoring, note that 
the indicator is not an absolute scale to 
measure the quality of each internal 
system, but offers a checklist of whether 
procedures exist at all. The indicator is 
not offered as a social science research 
tool but, instead, as a project evaluation 
and selection tool. It is best used to show 
the relative value of different projects, 
with some leeway offered in judgments. 
Note that the indicator is “relative” rather 
than “absolute” and each person doing 
scoring might score higher or lower, but 
should produce similar overall relative 
measures. Like most indicators, answers 
to each question would need to be 
“calibrated” if the goal were to assure that 
different observers make the exact same 
determinations. To do so would require a 
longer manual for standardized, precise 
answers across observers. To try to help 
calibrate the indicator as a guide for 
scoring, a detailed example of scoring is 
provided at the end of this article and 
several organizations are also scored. 
After coming up with individual scores 
(“Yes” or “No”) on each question, the way 
to interpret the results is to take scores 
from each category and to put them into 
the Scoring Table (see Table 3) to see the 
final result. To use the Scoring Table, the 
scores for the different categories should 
be placed directly on the table. Then, the 
final assessment is made by taking the 
score that is the lowest (furthest left) of 
the three different measures, and reading 
the label at the top row of the table. Since 
the first category is broken up into two 
parts, there is also an explanation of how 
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to take the two scores and come up with 
an overall score for the first category. The 
overall score of the three categories is 
determined by the lowest of the three 
categories since the quality of the 
evaluation is determined by its weakest 
link. Even if everything seems to be in 
place in two of the areas, the degradation 
of one of the systems makes the overall 
evaluation ineffective. 
For a quick understanding of different 
results and possibilities, a second table 
(see Table 4), “Classification of Evaluation 
Systems based on Indicator 
Measurements” shows all of the possible 
combinations of scores and what each set 
of scores would imply about the 
evaluation and management system. This 
table just presents the different “types” of 
systems that might be found. Since there 
are three evaluation categories and they 
can be classified as “High” or “Low,” there 
are eight potential “types,” each 
corresponding to a certain kind of 
organizational model. Actual examples of 
specific systems with these scorings are 
shown towards the end of this article, 
following presentation of the indicator. A 
number of organizations whose scores fit 
these “types” are presented. At the end of 
the article is a through, detailed analysis 
of the UNDP’s evaluation system that 
walks the reader through the 
organization, culling information that can 
be used to score its evaluation system and 
then walking the reader, step-by-step, 
through the scoring process. This is a case 
study of how to examine an evaluation 
system, break it down into its component 
parts, identify its weaknesses, and then 
score its effectiveness. 
Overall, the power of this indicator is 
that it highlights how a weakness in one 
category of performance points to a very 
specific, systemic type of problem that 
needs to be corrected. For example, an 
organization: 
 
 Can have a professionally protected 
evaluation that has absolutely no 
impact because the results are not 
linked to any real changes or 
management oversight. 
 Can have a strong management 
system that is open to the public, 
but can use evaluators to promote a 
hidden or political agenda if there 
is no professional protection of the 
evaluator; or 
 Can follow “professionalism” in 
every way but destroy the public 
interest and public purpose 
because of no accountability to the 
public, such as businesses that 









Scoring Table for the Evaluation Indicator and its Components 
 
 SCORING 
Measures Corrupted Evaluation Likely 
Used as a Propaganda 
and Fundraising Tool 
Vulnerable Evaluation Partly Effective Monitoring but 
Potentially Vulnerable 
Evaluation Subject to 
Influence  
Professional, Accountable 
Evaluation Protecting public 
spending 
I. Fulfillment of the Functions of a 
Management Control System: 
Utilizing Proper Evaluation 
Roles, Expertise, and Data 
Collection 
(Weighting of scores of A. and B.) 
At most 0 – 1 point in category 
A or 0 – 2 points in 
category B 
The evaluation is just for show 
(window dressing; a 
formality only) and has no 
impact. 
At most 1.5 - 2 points in 
category A or 2.5– 4 
points in category B 
The evaluation system is 
probably driven by an 
outside agenda or is co-
opted internally. 
At most 2.5 – 3.5 points in category 
A or 4.5 – 6.5 points in 
category B 
A strong system needing only some 
changes 
All 4 points in A and  
All 7 points in B 
A model professional 
management system 
A. Managerial Controls that Apply 
Evaluation Systems to Rewards 
and Punishments:  
(0 to 4 points) 
0 to 1 point 
An evaluation system that is 
symbolic but that has no 
impact. 
1.5 - 2 points 
An ineffective or vulnerable 
evaluation system 
2.5 – 3.5 points 
A working evaluation system that 
could be more 
professionalized 
All 4 points— 
A model professional 
management system 
B. Quality of Seven Individual 
Oversight Systems that 
Evaluations Monitor  
(0 to 7 points) 
0 – 2 points 
No measurements or systems. 
Evaluation is for show.  
2.5 - 4 points 
Weak organization probably 
driven by an outside 
agenda or run for 
bureaucrats and their 
friends 
4.5 – 6.5 points – Strong 
management system in most 
areas 
All 7 points –  
A model professional 
management system 
II. Transparency and Accountability 
of the Evaluation, Itself: 
Watchdog Role  
(0 to 6 points) 
0 – 2 points 
The system is designed for 
bureaucrats to protect their 
interest against the public 
2.5 – 4 points 
There is lip service or 
recognition of public 
protections that 
sometimes work but can 
be thwarted. The public 
may be fooled by what it 
is able to see. 
4.5 – 5.5 points  
The system is open. Nevertheless, 
quality is vulnerable and some 
opinions may still be 
suppressed 
All 6 points –  
The public receives everything and 
can be assured of quality 
III. Protection of Professionalism and 
Political Insulation of 
Evaluations  
(0 to 8 points) 
0 – 2 points  
No real protections at all 
2.5 – 4 points Professionals 
will have to battle 
against pressures and 
take considerable risks 
4.5 – 7.5 points Vulnerable to 
financial pressures or risk of 
violations of professional 
standards. 
All 8 points –  
A model system of protection and 
professionalism 









Classification of Evaluation Systems (8 Potential Types) Based on Indicator Measurements 
 
Type of Evaluation System I. Functioning Management Control 
System 
II. Transparency ad Accountability of the 
Evaluation (Government Watchdog 
and Public Protection) 
III. Professionalism and Political 
Insulation of Evaluations 
1) Model Evaluation System High High High 
2) Efficient BUT Totalitarian System 
(Government) or Strong Business 
Management with weak public 
oversight 
High Low High 
3) Politicized Evaluation to Promote a 
Hidden Agenda 
High High Low 
4) Corrupted Evaluation System 
Protecting Bureaucrats 
High Low Low 
5) Evaluation System that Exists only for 
Show as a Formality 
Low High High 
6) Democratic oversight exists but without 
professionalism (common to NGOs) 
Low High Low 
7) New or small organization without 
institutional procedures 
Low Low High 
8) Useless or Non-existent Evaluation 
System 
Low Low Low 
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Measures/Sub-Factors. Below are the 25 
questions of the indicator in the categories 
described above. Most of the questions are 
clear cut “Yes” (1 point) or “No” (0 points 
or negative points for harms) in scoring, 
but in cases where there is a judgment 
call, it is possible to opt for a “Debatable” 
(0.5 points for benefits and 0 points for 
harm). (Note that the questions are 
numbered by their category, rather than 
from one to 25.) 
 
I. Fulfillment of the Functions of a 
Management Control System: Utilizing 
Proper Evaluation Roles, Expertise and 
Data Collection. These questions go to the 
heart of what a management control 
system is designed to do to make an 
organization run effectively. The 
questions reveal whether or not the 
necessary feedback and monitoring 
systems and evaluation functions actually 
exist to make evaluations meaningful 
exercises for measuring organizational 
and individual performance, or whether 
they exist just for show. The first sub-
category looks at whether there is a 
management feedback system using 
results monitoring to reward or punish 
performance and the second sub-category 
lists the required performance 
measurements that every organization 
needs. (11 questions with a total of 11 
points divided into two sub-categories) 
 
I.A. Managerial Controls Exist that Apply 
Evaluation Systems to Rewards and 
Punishments: There is Professionalism in 
the Various Management Functions in 
the Cycle of Activities of the Organization 
so that the Evaluation is Meaningful. 
These questions reveal whether 
evaluations are actually used as a form of 
managerial control that makes a 
difference in organizational performance 
and change, or whether they are just “due 
diligence” paperwork for show. (4 
questions with a total of 4 points) 
 
Question I.A.1. The Evaluation Acts as a 
Control Linked to Personnel Systems and 
Audits, for which Employees are 
Rewarded or Punished. There are 
performance-based incentives in the 
system, itself, from the design phase to 
the review phase of every project/product. 
The evaluation feeds into those incentives 
with the results of the evaluation used not 
only to change organizational spending 
but to reward and punish employees on 
the basis of performance. The evaluations 
are not just perfunctory, providing 
required information or seeking to 
convince those in the organization to 
change or follow “best practices” and 
share in a “community of practice” but are 
managerial control tools with serious 
implications. The evaluation works to 
measure achievement on specific 
“functions” in an organization that have 
specific relevance to beneficiaries – to 
promote or protect a particular resource, 
for example – with each function designed 
to have measured results rather than just 
serving as a title or “area” of control. No 
points if the evaluation does not go 
directly to the funding/hiring authority 
but goes instead to the implementing 
agency to review itself, since this is 
immediate evidence that results are not 
used for punishment of poor performance. 
 
Scoring: Yes = 1 
Debatable = 0.5 
No = 0 
 
Question I.A.2. The Evaluation Function 
is Appropriately Measured, Itself, for its 
Value Added: Evaluation 
Spending/Investment is Related to 
Calculated Organizational Income and 
Savings. The evaluation serves a vital role 
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in organizational performance and is 
funded in ways that directly impact on 
organizational performance. Evaluation 
results feed into key decisions on 
spending and strategy. Specific 
evaluations and funding for them are 
determined through studies that link the 
benefits of information with the costs of 
that information. As a general rule, 
organizations should commit 5 to 10% of 
funding to research and development that 
includes the evaluation function, with 
auditing separate. No points if the 
evaluation is simply “required” by a donor 
and serves no purpose other than as a 
legal obligation to justify funding, without 
any rational relation to other 
organizational incentives for quality. In 
such cases, the system is short-circuited, 
with pressures to merge or delay or de-
fund evaluations. “Final evaluations” to 
merely close out projects and offer 
“lessons learned” suggest that the 
evaluation system is just for show. 
 
Scoring: Yes = 1 
Debatable = 0.5 
No = 0 
 
Question I.A.3. There Exists a Backstop 
and Protection of the Integrity of the 
Evaluation System, Itself, Assuring 
Direct Accountability to the Actual 
Owners/Managers. The evaluation is 
conducted and overseen by an 
independent unit that reports to the 
highest management level of the 
organization and is independent of 
implementing managers but directly 
accountable to owners (stockholders for a 
business; taxpayers, a legislature with 
spending authority, and an independent 
and public representative judiciary for 
public spending) without any intervening 
bodies that can work to fortify opposition 
to objective evaluations. No points if 
internal “Ombudsman” or “hotlines” and 
fraud units are not publicly representative 
and directly accountable, or if they report 
to management rather than the public, or 
if they are called independent but have 
shared interests with implementing 
management (such as membership in the 
same union). In such cases, the evaluation 
unit can potentially thwart evaluation 
integrity by creating additional hurdles to 
the public (slowing down the process, 
wearing down complainants, and serving 
to target complainants). The backstop 
process must be backed by strong laws 
and offer sufficient interest/ penalties and 
support as incentives to complainants to 
act freely to protect the system. The costs 
to the complainants must be minimal (not 
requiring process in another country, or 
before an unenforceable body, for 
example). 
 
Scoring: Yes = 1 
Debatable = 0.5 
No = 0 
 
Question I.A.4. Specific and Distinct 
Measurement Systems Exist that can be 
Evaluated and that Create Individual 
Accountability. There are distinct sub-
systems into which evaluations can feed. 
The organization recognizes that 
evaluations need to include the 
professional skills that correspond to 
these 7 key systems/ roles for the 
evaluation to be meaningful. These 7 key 
systems/ roles include (and are tested 
individually in the next section)—strategic 
planning and assuring adherence to the 
organizational mission, fulfillment of 
requirements of project design; auditing 
of input spending; managerial accounting 
of efficiency of outputs; managerial 
accounting of efficacy of 
outputs/relevance; research and 
development functions for 
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projects; and assurance of the 
organizational sustainability and/or 
growth and replication of projects. The 
evaluation system needs to separately 
establish schedules and funding for 
measurement of these different roles and 
assure that evaluators that are hired have 
the skills to fit these different roles. No 
points if evaluators are given all of these 
multiple roles at once or if there is no 
rational plan for evaluators to allocate 
time and resources in ways that does 
justice to each of these areas in a strategic 
way.  
 
Scoring: Yes = 1 
Debatable = 0.5 
No = 0 
 
 
I. B. Quality of Seven Individual 
Oversight Systems that Evaluations 
Monitor. This section measures the 
quality of management systems in the 
seven key areas of operations (seven 
system areas) of an organization. It 
determines whether evaluations will have 
the necessary information to come to 
useful conclusions about performance. 
The questions closely follow information 
presented in Table II in the first part of 
the article. If such measures are weak, 
evaluators are likely being commissioned 
to perform a political or advertising role 
under the form of an evaluation, in order 
to justify more funding and cover for 
officials. (7 questions with a total of 7 
points) 
 
Question I.B.1. System 1. Protection of 
Organizational Mission and Strategic 
Planning to Fill It Efficiently and 
Competitively. There is a regular strategic 
planning function. Every intervention is 
rigorously screened to ensure that it meets 
two tests. First, it promotes the specific 
mission of the organization in a 
measurable way (solving a specific type of 
problem with a particular tool through a 
comparative advantage of the 
organization: to protect and promote 
development of a resource in a sustainable 
way on behalf of public beneficiaries and 
contributors for a government function 
and in a way that changes government 
action or provides a non-governmental 
function for a non-governmental 
organization). Second, is a comparatively 
better (more strategic) investment than 
other interventions in doing so. The 
measure of this function is whether there 
is a list of comparative benefits of projects 
and a screening device to reject projects 
that are weak or inappropriate after 
carefully measuring their fit. One type of 
failed system only offers categories and 
slogans of fit (“poverty” or “development” 
or “equity”) and actually substitutes other 
concerns such as opportunistic ones 
(donor funding) and attempts to do 
everything. Another failed type defines 
interventions on the basis of a specific tool 
that the organization uses (“capacity 
building”) rather than on a comparative 
advantage of the organization in solving 
the root causes of a specific problem. The 
measure of whether a government 
function and mission are accountable is 
the quality of legislation, public oversight, 
and public legal challenge to assure 
compliance and implementation. As a test 
of quality of this system, there should be 
regular strategic planning exercises 
(usually on an annual basis) and 
organizational management reviews, with 
expert managers and high level 
management should be trained in 
strategic planning. A simple spending 
plan or action plan or list of symptoms to 
be targeted, or a plan developed with 
partners or on the basis of slogans does 
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not qualify as a “strategic” plan. The 
evaluation role is to review the data and 
measures used for screening and for 
setting the organization mission. The 
evaluation should yield review of the 
mission and lists of projects and new 
approaches that would further the mission 
of the organization in a measurable way. 
No points if there is no measurable data to 
demonstrate the organization’s 
comparative advantage versus other 
organizations or if there is no one with 
comparable professional skills to a 
strategic planner, who is conducting the 
evaluation of the work of strategic 
planning. 
 
Scoring: Yes = 1 
Debatable = 0.5 
No = 0 
 
Question I.B.2. System 2. Professional 
Project Design and of Management 
Systems for Implementation. The project 
design applies professional expertise and 
detailed measures that link activities to 
root causes of the problem to be solved, 
not to symptoms, and that show the 
specific behavior changes/ changes in 
incentives and target actors. There are 
measured impacts and benchmarks that 
offer specific measurable goals per unit of 
spending on particular links in the causal 
chain of the problem. There is a clear 
distinction between “outputs” (processed 
inputs that result in a product like a book 
or policy or law) and “outcomes” that are 
measurable benefits to target groups and 
society. There is a clear logical framework 
that shows how specific inputs lead to 
specific outputs with measurable changes 
in root causes and measurable changes 
that follow to solve the problem. There is 
an explanation of how the specific 
intervention is the most strategic use of 
resources to change specific behaviors and 
incentives that will change specific 
outcomes and how the structure of 
management relates to the most efficient 
way to achieve this. For development 
projects, this framework is placed directly 
in the context of a sustainable 
development framework. A typical 
benchmark for this function in an 
organization is 5% of the project 
spending. The evaluation role is to review 
the data and logic of the project 
intervention with specialized skill in the 
area of the problem and root causes and 
in interventions that provide measurable 
changes in behaviors and measurable 
impacts on the problem. No points if the 
expert and the system do not offer specific 
quantifiable measures of the stages of 
problem solution rather than the 
symptoms. 
 
Scoring: Yes = 1 
Debatable = 0.5 
No = 0 
 
Question I.B.3. System 3. Cost Accounting 
and Cost Control Systems for 
Procurement and for Personnel. There is 
a professional cost control system that 
fulfills a watchdog function through 
independent comptroller/auditor spot-
check audits (different from due-diligence 
book-keeping audits) relying on a system 
of clear measurements of potential 
suppliers/ product costs/ quality levels of 
each purchase, as well as competitive 
bidding procedures. The cost control 
system works to examine ways of saving 
funds to achieve the same objectives, 
rather than simply tracks spending to 
purchases (book-keeping). The rule of 
thumb is generally that an external, 
independent auditing and accounting of 
inputs should be 2% of spending and that 
other cost control oversight measures pay 
their way by finding cost savings less than 
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the cost of the oversight to identify over-
spending. The evaluation role assures that 
spot checks have been independent and 
effective and that there are specific cost 
measurements and systems for 
continually generating savings and 
reducing waste. No points if the 
evaluation does not have the expertise to 
spot check and re-analyze each item of 
spending and to show where savings could 
have occurred and the amount of savings, 
as a check on whether the overall audit 
functioning is performing effectively. 
 
Scoring: Yes = 1 
Debatable = 0.5 
No = 0 
 
Question I.B.4. System 4. Managerial 
Accounting for Efficiency of Outputs for 
Measurable Technical Levels (Quality per 
unit cost of output benefit). A managerial 
accounting system exists that combines 
technical measurements of quantifiable 
results with units of spending to yield 
efficiency measures (technical value for 
unit of spending). There are also measures 
and screening devices for whether the 
appropriate financial mechanisms were 
used to fit behavioral incentives and to 
assure the appropriate functioning of the 
market, of government, and of NGOs 
without improper subsidization of either. 
Managers understand their role in 
managerial accounting of outputs and 
they appropriately use technical experts in 
the design phase, making strategic choices 
of interventions on the basis of output per 
unit cost. The evaluation role is to use 
technical expertise to oversee the 
measures and choices of interventions on 
the basis of quality, to see that the 
appropriate technical and quality 
measurements are included and that they 
are linked with spending measures, and 
that the benchmarks in use reflect 
standards of the industry. No points if the 
evaluation does not have the expertise to 
analyze each intervention on the basis of 
its spending and to indicate specific parts 
of the budget that were inefficient or 
improper based on different kinds of 
financial alternatives and on professional 
benchmarks of impact on root causes of 
problems per unit of spending. No points 
if the organization does not understand 
the difference between cost of inputs 
(regular accounting) and cost per output 
and output benefit (managerial 
accounting) or claims that it “can’t” be 
measured. 
 
Scoring: Yes = 1 
Debatable = 0.5 
No = 0 
 
Question I.B.5. System 5. Clear Benefits 
Measures and Externalities Measures ae 
Linked to the Organization’s Mission and 
to Solutions that Address Root Causes 
(for Public Policy). A system of screening 
interventions for harms (social, cultural, 
environmental) and of measuring benefits 
already exists. The system records clear 
and quantifiable measures that are liked 
with an overall outcome related to the 
organization’s mission, including such 
categories as changes in behaviors, in 
relative power, and shifts of assets to 
promote sustainable human development 
for government projects. The system also 
offers relative comparisons to other 
interventions. For public projects, the 
outcome measures are fit directly into 
schemes for sustainable human 
development balances (population, 
consumption, and resources) and for total 
assets per capita for each ethnic-cultural 
group. The measures are also relevant and 
useful to citizens so that there can be clear 
oversight of the value of the organization. 
The evaluation role assures that all the 
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systems are in place, verifies the quality 
and accuracy of the measures, and offers 
comparative benchmarks. No points if 
unintended outcomes are hidden or not 
measured (particularly long-term 
impacts/ externalities), if measures that 
reflect a hidden or biased agenda are 
substituted (such as “income” for real 
development goals in development 
projects), or if measures are not linked to 
solutions to the root causes of the problem 
(rather than to amelioration of 
symptoms). 
 
Scoring: Yes = 1 
Debatable = 0.5 
No = 0 
 
Question I.B.6. System 6. Planning for 
Organizational Sustainability/ 
Maintenance/ Growth and Avoiding Co-
Dependency on the Problem. There is an 
organizational business plan and a 
strategy for promoting the recipient or 
institutionalizing the benefit in ways that 
are not dependent on continuing 
symptoms that need to be treated but that 
offer solutions to eliminate the problem. 
Systems produce such benefits and 
replicate/expand the models and advocate 
for them in ways that promote replication. 
For public projects, the business plan for 
organizational sustainability avoids 
dependency of the recipient on outside 
funds of a donor. The professional skills 
that are part of the planning for 
organizational sustainability include some 
version of financial systems analysis 
(public finance for government activity), 
financial analysis of linkages between the 
measured benefit and the beneficiaries in 
ways that links contributions with 
benefits, (social) marketing systems to 
promote replication, and systems of 
reinvestment and innovation (research 
and development in competitive 
technological advances that are 
commercially viable) that include 
calculations of the benefit of these 
investments in organizational 
sustainability. The evaluation role is 
largely that of financial expertise, to 
review the funding mechanisms to see if 
the measures have been correctly 
calculated and if the beneficiaries 
recognize these measures and purchase 
the product (for business) or contribute 
the service (government or civil society). 
No points if the measure of sustainability 
is based on “support from foreign donors” 
and if the beneficiaries of the project 
outcome are not directly linked to the 
purchasers in some way and the focus is 
only on whether the benefits of the project 
continue into the future. 
 
Scoring: Yes = 1 
Debatable = 0.5 
No = 0 
 
Question I.B.7. System 7. Scientific 
Research and Development System into 
which Evaluations Feed. A scientific 
measurement system of results exists that 
uses at minimum the methodologies of 
control groups and hypothesis testing and 
that employs individuals who are bound 
to professional codes and certification in 
the fields of outcomes and externalities 
that require measurement. This sub-
system feeds into the design and 
organizational mission systems. As a 
benchmark, spending on research and 
development should be some 5% of 
project spending to assure adequacy and 
quality of data measures, interpretation, 
and use of the data for development of 
new approaches. The evaluation role does 
not seek to do the measures for the first 
time but takes existing measures and 
offers scientific hypotheses, 
interpretations, and improvements, 
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building on the professionalism and 
systems of research that are 
institutionalized in the organization and 
that build on each other sequentially. No 
points if there is no evidence of following 
the scientific method. 
 
Scoring: Yes = 1 
Debatable = 0.5 
No = 0 
 
II. Quality of Transparency and 
Accountability of the Evaluation, Itself 
(Watchdog role). This scoring category 
can be used both for government 
processes as well as for private 
organizations (businesses and civil society 
organizations that conduct evaluations) to 
measure of the integrity of processes to 
meet an organization’s needs by providing 
information directly to the 
decisionmakers. If the organization being 
measured is a government agency, the 
“beneficiaries” are the citizens paying for 
the government activities and the citizen 
beneficiaries, and the questions are asked 
once. If the organization being measured 
is one that the public charters, as it does 
for private businesses and civil society 
organizations, the questions can be asked 
twice: once where the decision-makers are 
the shareholders/owners/members of the 
organization (to yield a stakeholder 
accountability score) and once to consider 
transparency and accountability to 
citizens, as for government organizations, 
to test whether government 
oversight/regulation of business and civil 
society organizations is accountable and 
transparent. (6 questions with a total of 6 
points) 
 
Question II.1. Beneficiary (including 
Taxpayers for Public Projects) Has 
Control over the Process and There is 
Direct Evaluation Reporting to the 
Budget Authority. Evaluations respond 
directly to the publicly accountable body 
that prepares the budget and not to the 
implementing stakeholder agencies. The 
evaluation is also insulated from any 
marketing unit or function of the 
organization that is seeking or can seek 
additional funding or work. For public 
spending, the commissioning body of the 
evaluation is one directly accountable to 
taxpayers and or beneficiaries of the 
spending through either direct and 
competitive election/removal and/or legal 
challenge and this commissioning body is 
separate from the implementing agent of 
the program being evaluated. For 
example, the evaluator reports to a 
legislature with separate powers and 
interests from the executing agency. For a 
business or NGO, the reporting is to top 
management with freedom to report 
directly to shareholders and also to 
government. (This question is similar to 
I.A.2. but goes further, not only protecting 
the evaluation quality but also assuring 
reporting.) 
 
Scoring: Yes = 1 
Debatable = 0.5 
No = 0 
 
Question II.2. No Intervening Agent or 
Screening Authority, Between the 
Individual Evaluators and the Budget 
Authority, Acts to Prevent Full Reporting 
and Openness on Public Matters to the 
Public, (Public or Public Bodies for Public 
Spending). Each evaluator has a direct 
relationship with the budget authority (for 
public spending, the public/public body) 
without any intervening private company 
management or other screening or vetting 
body to the evaluation. The evaluator’s 
work directly incorporates all public laws 
and protections of public whistleblowers 
and government actors, without placing 
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the evaluation in the private sector (under 
a private contractor who has the power to 
hire or fire subcontractors at will in ways 
that eliminate their public protections). 
The evaluator is not placed in any position 
where the standards of work override 
public interest and the public right to 
information that is not commercial, 
proprietary information or that of 
national security in BOTH the funding 
and recipient countries. Contracting 
provisions on public evaluations bind the 
evaluator to public law of the highest 
standard of EITHER the taxpayer or 
recipient country or funding organization 
(rather than the lowest standard of one of 
these). These laws cannot be overridden 
by any other kind of subcontracting or 
intermediate contracting with private 
contracting firms running the evaluation. 
Nor can any evaluation contract seek to 
create any agreements for secrecy or 
withholding information from the public 
that is different from the laws and 
protections of business secrets, national 
security secrets or protection of individual 
informants, and that interferes with the 
public right to information. 
 
Scoring: Yes = 1 
Debatable = 0.5 
No = 0 
 
Question II.3. Drafts Reach the 
Public/Budget Authority for Discussion. 
The public/ budget authority is assured of 
seeing the raw reports of evaluators and 
has an opportunity to present information 
directly to, receive full information from, 
and to interact directly with evaluators in 
ways that assure no information is 
suppressed. Any pressures or changes or 
replacement of a report or of an evaluator 
will be reported and will be visible. Draft 
reports and any changes in draft reports 
as well as the reasons for them are placed 
on public record. 
 
Scoring: Yes = 1 
Debatable = 0.5 
No = 0 
 
Question II.4. Information Access is 
Enforceable and Dissemination 
Regulations Protect the Beneficiary and 
Evaluator. The organizational regulations 
and public law are sufficient to assure 
protection of the rights of the beneficiary 
to information (e.g., Freedom of 
Information laws and real enforcement 
through easy-to-use court procedures 
before publicly representative judges, for 
public information) and the rights of the 
evaluator to disseminate information 
freely to the beneficiaries. In case of 
public information, the evaluator is able 
to make that information available 
without restrictions of copyright or other 
barriers, controls of ownership or threats 
of costs to safety or career, and with 
sufficient Whistleblower protections. 
 
Scoring: Yes = 1 
Debatable = 0.5 
No = 0 
 
Question II.5. Quality of Evaluation 
Reporting is Sufficient for Beneficiaries 
to Use to Make Judgments on 
Comparative Value and Spending. 
Evaluation reporting is sufficiently 
standardized so that the evaluations 
contain appropriate and adequate data, 
processed with benchmarks and 
information sufficient for a cost benefit or 
other comparative return/benefit measure 
on relevant categories of evaluation. 
Decision-makers, including the public, 
can read the reports and use them to 
make comparative funding decisions that 
are rational and defensible. Reports that 
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do not refer to common and comparative 
standards but that describe project 
spending as in its own category earn no 
points. 
 
Scoring: Yes = 1 
Debatable = 0.5 
No = 0 
 
Question II.6. Real and Measurable 
Information Delivery and Access. Project 
design and information on the choices 
available at the design stage, interim 
evaluation reports, and final evaluations 
all reach the beneficiaries in a regular and 
routine manner such that the information 
is readily available in ways that the 
beneficiaries (not the implementing 
stakeholders) can influence the funding 
and professional quality of the 
interventions at each stage, as well as hold 
individuals accountable.  
 
Scoring: Yes = 1 
Debatable = 0.5 
No = 0 
 
III. Ability to Safeguard Professionalism 
and Politically Insulate Evaluations: A 
Test of Quality and Objectivity. The 
questions here cover the most common 
and key areas where pressures are 
currently exerted to compromise 
evaluations. There may be other areas in 
the steps of the process from hiring to 
conduct of the evaluation to presentation 
of results to final payment that can 
compromise the objectivity of the 
evaluation and put pressures on 
evaluators. In fact, one weak link in this 
chain of protecting professionalism can 
circumvent it. It may be important to 
continue to revise this list to add tests of 
other practices. (8 questions with a total 
of 8 points). 
 
Scoring: Yes = 1 
Debatable = 0.5 
No = 0 
 
Question III.1. Consultant Hiring Focuses 
on Professional Skills. The hiring process 
of consultants is conducted with 
appropriate measures of the skills that 
evaluators and decision-makers should 
use in determining specific value per unit 
spending. The hiring system understands 
the professional standards and separates 
the standard requirements from other 
considerations. There is a whistleblower 
law, transparency of selection, and a 
working legal procedure in which 
candidates can challenge the hiring 
procedure before a neutral public body, to 
assure against politicization and 
retaliation/blacklisting in hiring. No 
points if the hiring process is conducted 
by non-experts who focus on factors such 
as likeability or experience with the 
organization, ability to please project 
partners or attract funding, or factors like 
gender or nationality or cost or ease of 
administration of the evaluator (e.g., 
hiring of a company that can replace or 
backstop/pressure evaluators). 
 
Scoring: Yes = 1 
Debatable = 0.5 
No = 0 
 
Question III.2. Professional Standards of 
Work are Protected. A professional body—
either a union or a professional 
certification organization—exists to 
enforce an ethics code AGAINST 
organizations that hire/commission 
evaluators and on behalf of professionals 
acting as evaluators. These codes are 
required in an evaluator’s contract and are 
fully protected by law, with both the 
professional organization and the 
evaluator having legal standing to enforce 
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judgments in a court. These codes act not 
to protect salaries but to protect the public 
interest and rights of those impacted by 
the projects and outside of the 
implementing agencies (i.e., the code is 
not simply an “ethics code” that 
commissioning organizations use to shield 
themselves and improve their reputations, 
but is a code designed for and enforceable 
by the public). 
 
Scoring: Yes = 1 
Debatable = 0.5 
No = 0 
 
Question III.3. Independent Judgment is 
Protected through Evaluator Control of 
the Process. The independent judgment of 
each consultant is protected by contract 
for the exercise of the evaluation in a 
manner that protects the independence 
and objectivity of the evaluator in choice 
of methodology, questions and forms, and 
in the presentation of findings. The 
contract protects the consultant’s ability 
to be free of reporting back to the 
implementing agents about questions or 
methods, to be free of mistranslations or 
termination of questioning and answers, 
and any other micro-managing (to 
“protect relationships” and respond to 
“sensitivities”) that could interfere with 
the quality of information and could 
compromise the evaluation. 
 
Scoring: Yes = 1 
Debatable = 0.5 
No = 0 
 
Question III.4. Protected Independent 
Judgment in Reporting of Minority and 
Deviant Views. The evaluation contract 
and practice protect the independent 
judgment of each profession important to 
the evaluation and each evaluator. Each 
professional is guaranteed the space and 
opportunity to record a full dissenting and 
independent judgment, without fear that 
these will be overridden by a “team” or a 
“consensus” view or with any other 
limitations. 
 
Scoring: Yes = 1 
Debatable = 0.5 
No = 0 
 
Question III.5. Protected Continuation of 
Evaluations without being Subject to 
Termination without Professional 
Review. Evaluators are protected 
contractually from being replaced in the 
course of the evaluation or from early 
termination of the evaluation at any time 
before their signed final report is 
complete and made available directly to 
the beneficiaries, for any reason other 
than failure to fulfill their professional 
responsibilities, subject to review by 
independent professionals. 
 
Scoring: Yes = 1 
Debatable = 0.5 
No = 0 
 
Question III.6. Insulation of Evaluator 
Payment from Pressures. Pay is 
contractually calculated and protected on 
the basis of professional time, not on 
client “satisfaction” with the product. 
Evaluators need not report on interim 
findings as a justification for continuation 
of work. The contract is protected in an 
independent court that is easily accessible 
without costs to the evaluator (e.g., in the 
evaluator’s home country). 
 
Scoring: Yes = 1 
Debatable = 0.5 
No = 0 
 
Question III.7. Pre-Judicial Enforcement 
of Objectivity and Standards is 
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Independent of the Implementing Agents 
Being Evaluated. The control agency of 
the evaluation, including any 
Ombudsman, Hotline, or Fraud 
protection or Comptrollers, are 
completely separate from the agency 
under review without conflicts of interest 
(same union, same boss, shared interest 
in project funding or continuation or 
favorable review) and their work is 
overseen directly by the beneficiaries 
(including taxpayers on public projects). 
 
Scoring: Yes = 1 
Debatable = 0.5 
No = 0 
 
Question III.8. Whistleblower Protections 
Protect Standards of Performance and 
Rehiring of Evaluators. Performance 
measures used by the hiring authority to 
judge the quality of work of the evaluators 
are made openly available for the 
evaluator to see. Such measures meet 
professional standards and are reviewable 
by a professional body. Whistleblower 
protections include a system for 
evaluators/short term workers that allows 
for challenging performance measures 
and for review by a transparent body. 
 
Scoring: Yes = 1 
Debatable = 0.5 
No = 0 
 
How Some Organizations Do: After 
understanding how the test works, it is 
easy to apply to an organization in just a 
few minutes and with close agreement 
among anyone using it. Below are several 
examples showing how different 
organizations and projects score, from 
best to worst. 
Both generalized and actual examples 
are presented below; actual examples in 
the cases of public organizations like the 
United Nations system and the European 
Commission, and generalizations about 
types of businesses and civil society 
organizations, without naming the specific 
organizations. 
Note that even though not every 
question applies to every kind of project, 
the scoring is still designed to yield a 
scoring spread that leads to categorization 
and comparison and that also shows how 
some organizations can do better or worse 
depending on their attention to specific 
features of a management system or of the 
evaluations process that are highlighted in 
the scoring system. 
 
Effective (but Partly Vulnerable) 
Evaluation Systems. The most effective 
evaluation systems are those in private 
businesses in competitive markets, where 
the incentives are those of cost savings, 
competition, and efficiency. At the same 
time, where public/government 
regulations are weak, as in most countries 
in the world today, there are still 
shortcomings in full public oversight on 
activities of business that are of public 
concern. Of the two “idealized” kinds of 
systems: the “model” evaluation system 
and the government totalitarian or 
business/statist system, neither really 
exists in this ideal form. In fact, 
totalitarian systems are not particularly 
efficient for long because the lack of 
oversight degrades professionalism. 
Businesses in competitive markets do 




































































High Low High 
 
Major Business in a Competitive 
Environment – Most corporate evaluation 
systems score as effective though partly 
vulnerable in cases of weak management 
or less competitive industries where 
departments or managers seek to hide 
their failures or avoid major changes. 
Competitive private companies will 
generally score all 4 points, reflecting 
professionalism, in the first category and 
5 of 7 points in the second category of 
management control systems, reflecting a 
partial effectiveness for public protection 
(but possibly professionalism for their 
own concerns of profits) losing only 2 
points in measures of whether they 
actually measure the external harms that 
business can cause to public interests and 
measure whether they are promoting 
products that people don’t need (like 
more drugs rather than preventative 
health). In other words, if they are judged 
only by their accountability to their 
stockholders, they will likely earn all 7 
points, but if the public is considered and 
government regulatory systems are weak, 
the score is only five points. Transparency 
and accountability to management 
generally scores about 5 points, as 
“effective,” given that there is a tendency 
for employees to hide weaknesses from 
management, and professionalism and 
protection of evaluations scores about 6 – 
8 points, as “effective,” (with loss of points 
for lack of whistleblower protections for 
outside consultants who usually work 
irregularly for a business) in meeting 
needs of management and shareholders 
for professionalism, though the score is 
slightly less if the scoring is done from the 
perspective of public regulation and 
protection of business. Note that where 
upper level managers really want to 
politicize an evaluation in order to 
promote a particular agenda that has 
already been determined, they will 
remove the professionalism protections in 
the third category and the evaluation will 
be of the type often found in domestic 
policy oversight, where bureaucrats have a 
strong control system but seek to promote 
a politicized agenda (below). 
 
Systems that Can be Partly Effective or 
Vulnerable. Domestic government 
programs can be effectively evaluated in 
strong democratic systems but are 
vulnerable in weak democracies to being 
captured by political interests controlling 



































































High Low Low 
 
U.S. Domestic Policy Departments: 
Domestic policy evaluation systems in 
countries where there is political 
competition and rule of law score as partly 
effective in responding to citizens who are 
both the direct taxpayers and 
beneficiaries, though they are also 
vulnerable to special interests and to 
bureaucrats degrading oversight and 
protecting their interests. In the category 
of management control systems, U.S. 
departments score about 2.5 points 
overall, for holding officials accountable 
through spending authorities and 
generally about 4.5 points out of 7 for 
including most kinds of screening, 
auditing systems, and measurements, 
though they are not always strong on 
assuring compliance with law and 
mission/strategic planning, or 
benchmarking managerial accountability 
of outputs and outcomes. Transparency 
and accountability varies in the effective 
range of about 4-6 points. It is the 
protection of evaluator professionalism 
that can be compromised by weak systems 
and points range from about 3.5 to 5.5. 
 
Failures: Systems that are Corrupted 
Internally or Externally and that Exist 
Only for Show: These organizations claim 
to be open to public inspection and to 
follow public processes, but the test 
exposes them quickly. Here is where 
international organizations that do 
development are found. They are almost 
entirely unaccountable to anyone and 
evaluators are mostly used to help 
insulate the system from public scrutiny 
and to keep money flowing. Typically, 
they score low on all categories, though 
some may be partly accountable (to donor 
agendas) or have some professionalism 
(where there are specific, measurable 
outputs to be delivered, such as health 
benefits) but lack the combination of all of 























































Low High High 
7) Democratic 
oversigh






Low High Low 
8) New or Low Low High 
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United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) - (See charts below, analyzing 
this organization in detail): In all three 
categories, UNDP scores in the range of 
corrupted evaluations, with 0 points for a 
management control system and only 0.5 
for specific measures that a control system 
would include; 0.5 points for transparency 
and accountability, and 2 points out of 8 
for professionalism and protection against 
politicization. This is a system with no 
measures and standards, no oversight, 
and no protection of professionalism. It is 
characteristic of a business that sells its 
position as an intermediary (in this case, 
access to government officials to promote 
foreign laws, agendas, or relationships) 
and takes a percentage of the transactions, 
rather than as a public body seeking to 
fulfill a specific public purpose. In this 
type of system, bureaucrats and other 
financially interested stakeholders 
(recipient governments and their 
contractors) put pressures on evaluators 
to offer praise and writing evaluations as 
advertisements for more work, and to 
hide any negative information from the 
public. The indicator suggests that the 
system is corrupted and the evaluation 
process and evaluators who remain in this 
system are also likely to be corrupted by 
it. 
Major Foundations (generalized): Major 
international foundations earn scores that 
suggest they are easily corrupted in their 
evaluation systems. The underlying 
problem appears to be that their main 
function is distributing money for a 
specific agenda defined by a donor, over 
which beneficiaries and the public have 
little oversight, making is easy for 
foundation administrators to serve their 
own interests with little monitoring and 
control to ensure compliance with other 
objectives. With the main function as 
giving away money and not focusing on 
results or accountability unless the donor 
is particularly knowledgeable about 
management and outcomes, the control 
system scores 1 point for having financial 
systems, making it corruptible, and 3-4 
points for the specific systems that it may 
have to monitor funds, making it 
vulnerable. With internal reporting only, 
the accountability score is about 2 points, 
though more if the founder is still in 
charge. As a foundation, public 
transparency, however, will be low. 
Depending on the foundation’s goals, 
evaluation professionalism could actually 
be effective in looking at specific goals like 
the delivery of grants for particular 
purposes, but this information is narrow 
and may or may not lead to 
accountability. 
U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and, similarly, 
other country donor agencies – USAID is 
slightly more accountable than the UN 
system because it is partly accountable to 
taxpayers and funds are monitored by a 
legislature but the system also scores in 
the range of those where evaluations are 
corrupted. The agency is susceptible to 
capture by its bureaucrats or by special 
interests seeking special benefits 
(implementing agents or political interests 
who override public law and agenda) 
because the activities occur overseas 
where they are hard for the public to 
monitor, and beneficiaries (and those 
harmed) by projects do not have rights in 
the U.S. In the management control 
system category, overall, USAID scores 
about 2 points, registering as vulnerable, 
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but overall control by the public is 
practically non-existent and earns only 2 
points, in the “corrupted” range because 
of a weak management system that is 
typical of development aid administration 
and conflicting and hidden agendas. 
Professionalism is partly protected by 
laws, earning 2.5 points, but is vulnerable 
because of the lack of most protections 
and the use of contracting procedures that 
allow government bureaucrats to 
manipulate evaluations. Transparency is 
partly protected by laws but only weakly, 
earning 2 points, and reflecting that 
foreign policy activities, even aid, are 
among the least transparent of those of 
governments. The results here seem to 
suggest that aid policies are not really 
intended to produce results that protect 
beneficiaries, and maybe not even the 
taxpayer public in the donor countries, 
but are really discretionary funds to buy 
influence and prestige with governments 
and/or citizens of recipient countries. 
Other United Nations Agencies such as 
UNICEF, ILO, WHO: Other UN agencies 
score about the same as UNDP, with 
evaluation systems scoring as “corrupted” 
for the same reasons but with slightly 
better scores on control systems – 1.5 
points of out 7, though still easily co-opted 
– and up to 3 points for protection of 
professionalism of evaluators, in the 
vulnerable category, due to the fact that 
some of their projects are relief efforts and 
delivery of aid where there are specific 
health or other benefit measures that are 
less subject to politicization and 
difficulties of measurement as technical 
advisory services. At the same time, some 
of these agencies micro-manage 
evaluations through their evaluation 
offices in ways that seek to control results 
directly, and their score on transparency 
and accountability can drop to 0, denoting 
un-accountable and scoring as 
“corrupted.” 
International and local development 
NGOs (generalized): Although the 
systems in use in NGOs vary from 
professional and results-driven cost-
conscious management working with very 
little money and seeking to maximize 
results, to donor driven systems run by 
administrators with little or no real 
management expertise and with an 
incentive to keep projects running 
regardless of impact, the lack of any 
required standards forces many of the 
most well-known organizations down to 
the lowest denominator where they are 
vulnerable to being corrupted. There is a 
bit of a paradox that small organizations 
tightly controlled by their founders, have 
strong adherence to mission and 
efficiency but lack management skills, 
while larger organizations have better 
systems, particularly for measuring goods 
delivery (like the UN agencies, above) but 
no incentives to be accountable to their 
beneficiaries or to taxpayers who donate 
to them. They may only be accountable to 
donor controls, ironically making them 
slightly more transparent than some 
government agencies might be, but those 
controls often have the same problems as 
the donor systems, themselves, with an 
added layer of self-interested stakeholders 
with an interest in politicized evaluations 
and with fewer protections of 
professionalism than in government. In 
all three categories, a typical international 
development NGO scores in the range of 
corrupted evaluations, with 1 points for a 
management control system (noting some 
possible controls) but 0 points for specific 
measures that a control system would 
include; 1-2 points for transparency and 
accountability, and 0.5 points for 
professionalism and protection against 
politicization.  
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European Commission (EC): It might be 
surprising that the EC’s evaluation system 
of its development projects scores among 
the most “corrupted,” given that many 
countries in Europe have very strong 
domestic accountability and evaluation. 
The problem is that the EC is currently 
not really accountable to citizens or even 
to its member governments, let alone 
recipients in developing countries. This 
indicator confirms many of the criticisms 
that have appeared in the press about the 
EC, including reports by the European 
Court of Auditors that the EC budget 
violated basic accounting standards every 
year over the past decade, with not only 
no attempt at reform, but firing of 
whistleblowers like the EC’s chief 
accountant, Marta Andreasen (The Times, 
2004), and harassment of newspaper 
reporters like Stern’s Hans-Martin 
Tillack, who have investigated its 
corruption (2009). Countries deliver 
money to the bureaucracy but there is no 
oversight and there is no political 
agreement on standards or even on 
mission, leading to little clarity of mission 
other than that of trade promotion (the 
original goal of the European Union) 
replacing even development goals. In all 
three categories, the EC scores in the 
range of corrupted evaluations, with 0 
points for a management control system 
and 0 points for specific measures that a 
control system would include; 0 points for 
transparency and accountability (since 
neither the European Parliament or even 
the European Audit have any real power 
to oversee the Commission, with citizens 
powerless to directly challenge the 
bureaucracy), and 1 point out of 8 for 
professionalism and protection against 
politicization. The EC uses the same 
contracting procedures that USAID uses, 
through contractors, that enables it to 
pressure evaluations, and its supposedly 
“independent” Anti-Fraud unit is not 
accountable to citizens but is itself a 
bureaucracy with officials in the same 
union as those whom they are supposed to 
hold accountable. 
 
Post-Script: Solutions  
 
The irony of exposing the flaws in 
evaluations systems today is that the 
“experts” who are in the position to make 
changes have little incentive to change, 
while those who are best protected by 
change are the least informed and 
organized about where or how to begin to 
push for reforms. An indicator can 
facilitate change, but like other improved 
tools, they must be in the hands of those 
willing and able to use them. 
Professional evaluators in the 
organizations that score the worst on the 
new indicator in this article will likely not 
even recognize their failures. 
They will have a hard time 
understanding or admitting that they have 
been trying to perform functions that 
require several sets of professional skills 
that are outside their individual or 
department repertoires. They are likely to 
say that cost-benefit and efficiency 
analyses and benchmarks do not apply. 
They may say that this business-like 
approach that introduces a variety of 
professional expertise takes the artistry 
and “humanistic” or “human” judgment 
out of their work, though in fact it does 
the opposite by supplementing it with 
additional expert analysis from multiple 
fields across the larger spectrum of 
human achievement. 
They are likely to respond defensively 
to suggestions for more public oversight 
of their work, and to claim that 
accountability is a form of “policing.” They 
are likely to say that oversight implies 
David Lempert 




“mistrust” and that their good faith is 
being questioned when evaluations 
promote accountability. They may say that 
holding a government official accountable 
for results is unfair because there are “too 
many factors.” 
Overall, such responses from many 
“professional evaluators” will demonstrate 
exactly why many of the people in place in 
current systems are part of the problem 
and not the solution. Indeed, the only real 
solution is mobilization of the public. 
This author has suggested the 
formation of Donor Monitor NGOs that 
act as public advocates (Lempert, 2008a) 
and has designed a full set of other 
governance reforms in media, 
organizational oversight, private attorneys 
general and other citizen powers that 
would promote professionalism and 
accountability at the level of constitutional 
changes (Lempert, 1994) as well as 
educational and cultural reforms 
(Lempert, et al., 1995). But who will fund 
and promote them? It is as if we are at a 
stalemate in attempts at real human 
progress. 
In short, foxes have entered the 
henhouse in design and evaluation of 
international development projects as well 
as many other governmental systems, and 
there is a need to devise better oversight 
systems and architecture of henhouses. 
The foxes and failed architects, who have 
allowed the foxes to enter, see approaches 
like the one in this article as unfairly 
stigmatizing them and not praising them 
for simply doing their best in their roles. 
But the foxes currently have neither the 
incentive nor the consciousness of their 
role in causing the harm, to achieve 
solutions. The only way that change can 
really occur is if farmers and consumers 
who have an interest in the oversight and 
partly the hens act collectively to protect 
their interests. This article offers one tool 










Scoring of UNDP on the 25 Component Questions of the Indicator 
 
Preliminary Information for Assessment 
Legal Structure of the 
UNDP Evaluation 
System, According to 
Law (from the UNDP 
Website, referencing 
U.N. General Assembly 
Resolution 59/250 of 
2004) 
 
1) The Evaluation System 
Evaluation Mandate describing the systems and goals: 
 “the systematic evaluation of United Nations system operational activities by assessing their impact on poverty eradication, economic growth and 
sustainable development of programme countries. It further mandates the United Nations system to promote national ownership and capacity 
development and to make system-wide progress in collaboration in evaluation.”  
 Note that: The UNDP mission is not referenced in this document, nor are other international laws. 
 “strengthen partnerships with governments and key stakeholders.” 
 Note that: Key stakeholders are not defined. There is no clarity on whether bureaucrats and implementers using UN funds are the key stakeholders 
or whether the beneficiaries and taxpayers are. There is no explanation of how the competing goals of “growth” and “sustainable development” are 
to be achieved and no reference to other legal obligations and treaties that would put sustainability and cultural rights as the priorities, with 
growth only one of the choices of sustainable human development that is consistent with international laws and UNDP mission. There is no 
definition of “poverty” or reference to international standards and laws. 
Implementation and utilization of evaluation findings: 
 32. Units responsible for functions or programmes that have been evaluated should systematically implement evaluation recommendations when 
these have been agreed to by management. 
 Note that: No enforcement mechanism is specified other than the Executive Board. 
 41. Country offices, regional bureaux, and practice and policy bureaux will be required to: (a) prepare an evaluation plan, based on guidelines 
established by the Evaluation Office, which will include mandatory and other evaluations; and (b) cost this plan, and allocate the requisite funds 
from appropriate project and programme budgets. 
 Note that: There is no measurement of cost-benefit that links evaluations to value-added or that sets any quality standards for the evaluation. 
2) The Watchdog Role 
Oversight:  
 The Executive Board of UNDP/UNFPA is the custodian of the evaluation policy. The Executive Board: (b) ensures the independence of the 
evaluation function; 
 The Administrator of UNDP is accountable for UNDP results, and: appoints the Director of the Evaluation Office, in consultation with the 
Executive Board, 
 Evaluation units of the associated funds and programmes are the custodians of the evaluation function in their organizations 
Accountability and Transparency:  
 33. All UNDP evaluation reports will be made public. 
 “Evaluation units” will, respectively, for their fund or programme: (i) ensure the maintenance of a publicly accessible repository of evaluations; 
 Note that: No enforcement mechanism is specified 
3) Objectivity and Professionalism 
Independence.  
The evaluation function should be structurally independent from the operational management and decision-making functions in the organization so 
that it is free from undue influence, more objective, and has full authority to submit reports directly to appropriate levels of decision-making. 
Management must not impose restrictions on the scope, content, comments and recommendations of evaluation reports. 
 Note that: No standards or enforcement mechanism is specified other than the Executive Board. The role and funding of the Executive Board are not 
specified. 
Protection of Professional standards and Evaluators: 
38. EO will support a network of evaluation practitioners who will be responsible for nurturing a culture of evaluation in the organization by integrating 
evaluation into training programmes; promoting the use of quality standards; disseminating methodologies; providing technical guidance; and 
sharing evaluative knowledge. 
 Note that: No mention is made of protections of evaluators or reference to their professional standards and no enforcement mechanism is specified 
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to ensure breadth and accountability of the “network.” 
Source: Executive Board of the United Nations Development Programme and of the United Nations Population Fund, The Evaluation Policy of UNDP, 
DP/2005/28, May 2006. 
http://www.undp.org/eo/documents/Evaluation-Policy.pdf 
Commentary provided by author. 
Mandate of the Evaluations 
Office (from the UNDP 
Evaluation Office 
Website) 
1) The Evaluation System 
Evaluations Office Mandate describing the system and goals: 
“to support the Administrator in his substantive accountability function and contributing to organizational learning through provision of systematic and 
independent assessment of results, effectiveness and impact of the substantive activities of the programme, including the special purpose funds 
under the Administrator's responsibility. 
- Refocus EO's policy, strategy and priorities to help in the repositioning of UNDP and enhance its relevance as a knowledge-driven global advisor and 
catalyst in the context of rapidly changing global development conditions.  
- Support improving UNDP's development effectiveness through introduction of methodological innovations and application of Results-Based 
Management.  
- Support implementation of the organization's change initiatives through mainstreaming the culture of measurement, monitoring and evaluation. 
 Note that: There is no definition of the mission of the office in terms of sustainable human development as defined in treaties and measures 
(including the U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, The Rio Declaration, 1992), by international treaty enforcement, or by 
promoting development or protecting specific resources in keeping with sustainable development. There is only a reference to the Millennium 
Development Goals that offers a set of general indicators that are not balanced by an organizational mission 
2) The Watchdog Role 
Oversight:  
 Note that: there is no mention of the public role or public over funds or assuring conformity with international law or with the interests of those who 
fund the UN system or the beneficiaries. 
Implementation and utilization of evaluation findings: 
 Note that: there is no statement of the office having any role in accountability of funds or other incentives to hold UNDP employees accountable for 
performance. 
Accountability and Transparency:  
“To maintain and develop partnerships with the UN system organizations (as chair of IAWG), multilateral banks, OECD-DAC on evaluation related 
work.” 
 Note that: there is no statement on how the office assures public transparency or accountability. The only relations mentioned are not those with the 
public but with other international organizations that actually have different missions and goals, such as the international banks.  
3) Objectivity and Professionalism 
Independence.  
 Note that: there is no mention of how independence of evaluations is protected. There is no definition or explanation of how the differences between 
local control and international standards, between donor goals and UNDP standards are resolved and whether there is any oversight by the 
Executive Board or whether the Executive Board has actually delegated its oversight role to the bureaucrats, to monitor themselves. (See below) 
Protection of Professional standards and Evaluators: 
 Note that: there is no statement on professionalism and protections.  
Source: UNDP Evaluation Office website:  
http://www.undp.org/eo/eo-mandate.htm 
Commentary provided by author. 
Critique of UNDP 
Evaluations as 
Presented on the 
UNDP Website (Direct 
quotes from Evaluation 
Executive Summary) 
 
1) The Evaluation System 
Evaluation Mandate describing the systems and goals: 
 “[I]n practice, mobilization of resources and delivery are more powerful drivers of individual performance among programme staff than 
achievement of outcome level results. 
 “[A] single, simple and consistent message on resource mobilization [in place of other missions and goals] … was communicated to both internal 
and external audiences; [with] development of systems to track, measure and report managers’ success in mobilizing resources; and a clear 
perceived link between successful resource mobilization and advancement within the organization.  
 “The country programme outcomes against which UNDP is expected to deliver are poorly defined; the logic linking outputs delivered by UNDP 
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with achievement of the outcomes is often not explained; and therefore, this reporting system fails to report on UNDP performance relative to 
what it is accountable for [other than the goal that the new UNDP administrator has substituted for substantive goals; those of raising money and 
transferring it to governments and implementers]. 
 “[Of 166 UNDP countries, only] Twenty-five offices have appointed monitoring and evaluation (M&E) specialists [15%] and 10 have an M&E unit. 
[only 6%] 
Implementation and utilization of evaluation findings: 
 “Results-based management assumes that managers have the flexibility to allocate programme resources to maximize results. That assumption 
does not generally hold true for UNDP.  
 “A notable omission is the lack of oversight systems that focus on tracking whether programmes use results to adjust resources such as people, 
money and partnerships in order to improve future results. 
 “The evaluation concludes that UNDP is largely managing for outputs rather than outcomes and that the linkages between outputs and intended 
outcomes are not clearly articulated. The introduction of corporate systems and tools, which have had some efficiency benefits, have not however, 
strengthened the culture of results in the organization or improved programmatic focus at the country level. The current approach of defining and 
reporting against centrally defined outcomes tends to undermine UNDP’s responsiveness and alignment to nationally defined outcomes and 
priorities. 
 “With the advent of results-based management, the focus of results shifted to outcomes, but apart from the results-oriented annual report, no 
specific tools were developed to help monitor results. The ATLAS system is steadily gaining in importance, but its primary focus is financial 
management and project monitoring. 
 “Adoption of outcome-level evaluations in the countries visited has been slow. In general, they have been underbudgeted and poorly timed to 
influence the content of country programme documents. 
2) The Watchdog Role 
Oversight:  
 “Four relationships stand out as the most critical [and that are currently missing]: at the Executive Board, to ensure the programme is held to 
account for development results; between the Administrator or Associate Administrator and the Bureau Directors; between Directors of Regional 
Bureaux and Resident Representatives or Country Directors; and between Resident Representatives or Country Directors and staff within country 
offices. 
 “The oversight and management roles of the regional bureaux do not focus on results. 
 “Decentralization has been accompanied by delegation of authority over the country programme. Under current procedures, country programmes 
are not scrutinized for development potential by regional management, an abdication of responsibility. 
Accountability and Transparency:  
“There is no evidence that the Resident Representative/Country Director is held accountable for managing for outcomes, In practice, the corporate 
goals and service lines set by headquarters have proved too numerous, with very permissive definitions. This has led to country offices 
manipulating their programmes to fit into corporate service lines, diverted attention away from country needs and made reporting to the Executive 
Board more about process than substance.” 
 Note that: The UNDP Evaluation Office website also presents the “management’s response,” written as “UNDP believes.” While the response 
disagrees with the evaluation, the way it is presented actually supports the evaluation findings and re-enforces the report’s criticisms. The response 
offers no actual evidence of measurements or systems and makes it clear that the management can disregard the evaluation findings and 
recommendations without any sanction. It is also clear that the Evaluation Office controls the site and what is presented, without any public 
comments or rebuttal either in the preliminary or post-evaluation phase. The office is accountable only to itself. 
3) Objectivity and Professionalism 
Independence.  
 “Independent evaluation is an important element of results-based management to validate performance. Yet country evaluations conducted by the 
UNDP Evaluation Office have emphasized learning over accountability and have not measured performance against stated intentions. Validation 
occurs only through infrequent audits. 
 “Roles and responsibilities are generally clear, but country programme outcomes and indicators are not subject to quality assurance and there is 
little independent validation. Individual targets in the Results and Competency Assessment are self-selected and are often applied retrospectively 
and poorly linked to incentives. Despite the intended shift to managing for outcomes, individual staff remain tied to a project orientation and 
accountability for outputs.  
Protection of Professional standards and Evaluators: 
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 Note that: there appears to be evidence on the UNDP Evaluation site’s web page that even this critical evaluation was also controlled and possibly 
pressured by the Evaluations Office. The report itself lists the “Evaluation Office Task Manager” on the front page and includes a Forward from the 
head of the Evaluation office; something that would not appear if the evaluation were independent.  
Source: UNDP Evaluation Office, Evaluation of Results Based Management at UNDP: Achieving Results, 2007. Derek Poate and 9 staff. 
http://www.undp.org/eo/documents/thematic/RBM/RBM_Evaluation.pdf 
Commentary provided by author. 
Putting UNDP Monitoring 
Systems to Simple 
Tests of Transparency 
and Professional 
Protection 
1) The Evaluation System 
Implementation and utilization of evaluation findings:  
Though the Executive Board of UNDP, composed of representatives from 36 countries, is deemed to be the oversight body of UNDP spending, it 
appears that the group exists in name only and does not meet regularly or have any real staff to perform oversight functions. The UNDP’s website 
does not list any addresses for its members and its Secretariat has only one staff member listed without an email contact. It appears that it 
delegates its oversight work back to the UNDP bureaucracy, thus short-circuiting any real oversight.  
 The “Contact” link on the UNDP Executive Board website goes immediately to the UNDP bureaucracy, meaning that it is impossible to complain 
about the UNDP Administrator or the investigations office under the Administrator. The link leads to the following: 
- “If you wish to file a complaint against a UNDP staff member or about a UNDP project, programme or operation, you can do so using this online form 
and/or the Investigation Hotline.” http://www.undp.org/comments/form.shtml 
 According to the UNDP information public information office, there is no regular oversight function of the Executive Board. 
- “I had never heard of individuals wanting to send a complaint to all members of the Board. I am not aware of the EB having its own investigative unit. 
All I know is that frauds and violations to UNDP's regulations, rules and procedures are taken care of by the Office of Audits and Investigations 
[under the UNDP Administrator and part of the UNDP bureaucracy]. Mariana Gonzalez, UNDP Internet Feedback Message, August 22, 2008 
The documents that are the basis for projects and evaluations stem from a universal Project Document format that is now designed to reduce 
information and to speed the process of project acceptance. The form, itself, is not public. The amount of space on the cover page to describe the 
indicators for the project is limited to 37 characters for outcome indicator(s) and outcome targets. The focus of the document is on activities, 
partners, deliveries, costs, and timetables, without any focus on the problem, root causes, chain of solutions, comparative value of interventions, 
screening to assure compliance with the UNDP mission, screening to assure compliance with international law, or explanations of strategy. It is 
essentially a sales agreement for the transfer of funds rather than for the achievement of particular objectives. 
Source:  
United Nations Development Programme, Project Document: Required Formats and Contents, part of Results Management Guide, created by Dien Le, 
December 20, 2006, internal document. (Some applications are available on the web under this title but the form, itself, is not public) 
2) The Watchdog Role 
Oversight:  
The UNDP Executive Board does not have its own monitoring office equivalent to a watchdog office of funds/ investigative audit or managerial 
accounting office. (See additional explanations of the Executive Board, above.) 
Accountability and Transparency:  
Several provisions in evaluation contracts could be considered as attempts by UNDP to violate accountability and transparency given that there is no 
independent public review of what constitutes confidential and what is public information that UNDP bureaucrats and others are seeking to 
withhold in violation of the public interest. Among them are the following: 
 “all maps, drawings, photographs, mosaics, plans, reports, estimates, recommendations, documents and all other data compiled by or received by 
the Individual contractor under the Agreement shall be the property of UNDP, shall be made available for use or inspection by UNDP at 
reasonable times and in reasonable places, shall be treated as confidential and shall be delivered only to UNDP authorized officials on completion 
of work under the Agreement” 
 “Information and data that are considered proprietary by either UNDP or the Individual contractor … and that are designated as confidential 
(“Information”), shall be held in confidence” 
Source:  
UNDP, “SSA General Terms and Conditions” 
http://europeandcis.undp.org/files/hrforms/SSA_General_Terms_and_Conditions.doc 
3) Objectivity and Professionalism 
Independence.  
“The Individual contractor [UNDP evaluator] shall not take any action … that may adversely affect the interests of UNDP, and the Individual contractor 
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shall perform its obligations under the Agreement with the fullest regard to the interests of UNDP. 
 Note that: there is no definition or professional review of the “interests of UNDP” and this can easily be interpreted to mean “the (corrupt) interests 
of bureaucrats working for UNDP” in ways that compromise evaluations rather than protection of international law and the public, as it should. 
Protection of Professional standards and Evaluators: 
Disagreements between evaluators and UNDP are to be resolved by UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, with costs that are proportionately less to the UNDP 
than to an evaluator. 
Source:  
UNDP, “SSA General Terms and Conditions” 
http://europeandcis.undp.org/files/hrforms/SSA_General_Terms_and_Conditions.doc 
Overall Assessment and 
Interpretation 
While some evaluation regulations exist, the main potential for short-circuiting of the system appears to be the lack of any enforcement or 
accountability to the beneficiaries (taxpayers who pay or the cultures and individuals in the developing world who are to benefit). 
The broad scope of goals without a defined focus allows the organization to become politicized and for outcomes to be manipulated. Without 
accountability, an agenda like fundraising and transfer of funds, that meets the interests of bureaucrats, can easily replace accountability to public 
laws or to other missions. Decentralization of measures and controls also makes the organization susceptible to manipulation by governments and 
financial stakeholders at two levels: donors seeking outcomes for their own interest and recipients also seeking to manipulate goals and outcomes. 
There is a danger that additional regulations and directives that are presented as “reforms” could continue to disguise the overall weaknesses of systems 
that allow evaluations to function independently (under the control of self-interested management) and without any real control function for 
impact and for accountability. 
Analysis: I. Functioning Management Control System: Utilizing Proper Evaluation Roles, Expertise and Data Collection 
I.A. Managerial Controls that Apply Evaluation Systems to Rewards and Punishments: Professionalism in the Various Management Functions in the Cycle of Activities of the 
Organization so that the Evaluation is Meaningful: 
Question Indicator Scoring 
I. A. 1.  
 
The evaluation acts as a control linked to personnel 
systems and audits, for which employees are 
rewarded or punished? 
No, it does not. The UNDP Evaluation office in New York offers guidance on evaluations but does not 
exercise any control. Nor is any control exercised through the regional offices or the UNDP Executive Board. 
The UNDP missions, themselves, control their own work. Moreover, the standard that now seems to run the 
system is one of using the evaluation to appeal for donor funds rather than achieving any outcomes that are 
linked to the UNDP mission. Evaluations are not used for personnel reviews and performance is based on 
fundraising to sell the UNDP to donors for their objectives. 
0 points. 
I. A. 2.  
 
The evaluation function is appropriately measured, 
itself, for its value added and investments in it are 
related to calculated organizational income and 
savings 
No, it is not. The evaluation “plans” are simply pro-forma budgeting exercises to fulfill evaluation 
requirements and they have no measure of adding value.  
0 points 
I. A. 3.  
 
There is a backstop and protection of the integrity of 
the evaluation system, itself  
Theoretically, there is the UNDP Executive Board that represents a rotation of member countries, and each 
country can also challenge the UNDP Administrator. These mechanisms, however, are indirect, without any 
direct oversight by member countries or their citizens and no judicial body that can review challenges. 
Oversight is on paper, only, and the reality is that the UNDP runs itself. 
0 points. 
I. A. 4.  
 
There are specific and distinct measurement systems 
that can be evaluated and that create individual 
accountability? 
The new “Results Based Management” / ATLAS system is failing to focus on outcomes or performance 
measures and the Millennium Development Goals that have been set as targets are vague, contradictory, and 






 0 points. Non-existent controls. 
The only “system” that exists in the UNDP is an accounting system for money received and spent, which is a 
sales system for a business, not a system for government programs. Only fundraising is being rewarded. 
There is no real measurement system to speak of. The “communities of practice” and “knowledge” sharing 
approach is not a management system but a network. 
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I. B. Quality of Seven Individual Oversight Systems that Evaluations Monitor: 
Question Indicator Scoring 
I. B. 1.  
 
System 1. There is protection of organizational 
mission and strategic planning to fill it efficiently and 
competitively? 
No, there is not. International law and the organization’s mission appears to have been replaced by an 
agenda of fundraising. The mission of “sustainable human development” as defined by the Rio Convention 
has been lost and replaced with competing slogans that can justify any intervention, anywhere, without real 
measures. The project design formats are much like sales agreements, with no rigorous screening to assure 
consistency with international treaty protections for cultures and peoples, or benefits to public stakeholders. 
0 points. 
I. B. 2.  
 
System 2. There are professional design of project 
and of management systems for implementation? 
No, there are not. Most project design is done by project officers with no real research or research skills, or 
with too little time to really understand needs and how an intervention solves a problem. The project 
document required formats of the UNDP do not follow standard practice of requiring root cause analysis and 
problem trees or any other justification for the strategy of intervention other than that partners agree to 
accept funds for treatment of symptoms through approaches like “capacity building.” There are no 
benchmarks of outcomes. Logframes lack correct links of outputs to outcomes, often misclassifying inputs 
(trainings or manuals) as outcomes. There is no attempt to show how inputs change behaviors or incentives 
to lead to long-term changes that are part of the organization’s mission (sustainable development) that will 
improve the lives of beneficiaries. 
Though UNDP asserts that this is not the case, they are unable to produce real data to justify that they meet 
professional standards. 
0 points. 
I. B. 3. 
 
System 3. Cost accounting and cost control systems 
for procurement and for personnel, with spot checks 
of spending, exist? 
No, they do not. Financial systems are book-keeping systems that simply follow transfers of money with due-
diligence audits rather than managerial accounting audits that ask what real costs are, compare quality of 
different purchases, and justify spending as the highest quality for the lowest cost. In many countries, the 
UNDP works to subsidize government salaries (through per diems or payments to attend workshops that are 
part of their jobs) or to subsidize organizations that could raise funds from other sources or through the 
market. These expenses escape real oversight. 
0 points. 
I. B. 4.  System 4. There is a managerial accounting for 
efficiency of outputs for measurable technical levels 
(quality per unit cost of output benefit)? 
No, there is not. The one thing that UNDP does measure is outputs and for some kinds of what the UNDP 
calls “outputs” but that are really processed inputs and not systems or behavior changes that are really 
outputs – conferences, “training,” “handbooks,” draft laws, service delivery – there may be some measures of 
how much production costs. But since they do not include quality measures per unit cost, they are not really 
the kinds of managerial accounting inputs that allow for useful evaluation.  
0 points. 
I. B. 5. System 5. There are clear benefits and externalities 
measures linked to the organization’s mission and 
solutions that address root causes (for public policy)? 
No, there are not, and this is a clear failure of the UNDP system whose very mission is to apply international 
treaties to assure that cultures, environment, and equal opportunities are protected in each project and the 
overall balance of projects, rather than to claim that supporting one intervention at a time in each area 
(promoting productivity, for example, even at the expense of culture or without labor and environmental 
protections) is part of the development mission. 
0 points. 
I. B. 6. System 6. There is planning for organizational 
sustainability/ maintenance/ growth and avoiding 
co-dependency on the problem 
No, there is not. UNDP does not currently screen its inputs to determine which functions government, NGOs 
or the private sector can perform on their own and how they should be measured and funded, or how systems 
advocate for and plan their own funding for these needs. The incentive is actually for recipients to continue to 
seek technical assistance and foreign resources so that projects keep running, since it is more costly for 
UNDP project officers to design new projects with new partners than it is to continue funding of previous 
projects. No system in UNDP works to challenge this co-dependency. 
0 points. 
I. B. 7. System 7. There is a scientific research and 
development system into which evaluations feed? 
No, there is not. Although UNDP does seek to publish “best practices” and promote them among 
“communities of practice” networks, the reporting of individual cases lacks any kind of scientific design that 
would test hypotheses, and lead to meaningful measures. There is no system of scientific measures and at 
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best the UNDP relies on measures of outsiders like the World Bank, with different goals to promote. 
Comparisons are rarely, if ever, done with control groups for comparisons. Networks that share ideas that 




 0.5 points. Non-existent measures and standards. 
The characteristic of the UNDP system is one that has no measures and justifies itself on political grounds 
and “smile sheets” (whether implementing partners are “happy” that they receive benefits). Each project is 
defined as unique in itself such that no real standards apply or can be used for accountability. Evaluations 
transfer a burden to evaluators to “find” justification for projects such that bureaucrats can advocate for 
additional projects. 
Overall Score:  A. 0 points out of 4. B. 0.5 points out of 7. 
This is a system with no measures and standards and no oversight and is characteristic of a business that 
sells its position as an intermediary (in this case, access to government officials to promote foreign laws, 
agendas, or relationships) and takes a percentage of the transactions, rather than as a public body seeking to 
fulfill a specific public purpose. 
Analysis II. Transparency and Accountability of the Evaluation Itself (Government Watchdog and Public Protection) 
Question Indicator Scoring 
II. 1.  
 
There is real beneficiary (including taxpayers for 
public projects) control over the process with 
evaluation reporting to the budget authority? 
No, there is not. The UNDP Executive Board does not work directly with evaluators but delegates its 
authority to the bureaucracy under evaluation, thus short-circuiting the process. At no stage can the public 
hold the UNDP Executive Board or UNDP directly accountable through any mechanism. UNDP evaluations 
are run by the project officers whose work is under review and only nominally by the contracting offices who 
sign the checks with no accountability to the public. Governments that fund the UN system can only cut 
funds or buy projects but their citizens do not directly oversee the spending. The project officers write the 
Terms of Reference and manage the process, with review only by the Deputy Resident Representatives. 
Though there is a UNDP Evaluations office in New York, it exercises no control over evaluations other than to 
post guidelines for the process. Though the governments in host countries can control the local UNDP offices 
and though donor countries paying for specific projects can now set evaluation agendas (in direct violation of 
UN system regulations), the citizen beneficiaries and the citizens of countries funding the UNDP have no 
direct role in the evaluation process and no rights in it, and their legislative bodies or other public bodies do 
not commission the evaluations. 
0 points. 
II. 2.  
 
There are no intervening agent or screening authority 
and no attempts to evade full reporting and openness 
on public matters to the public, between the 
individual evaluators and the budget authority 
(public or public bodies for public spending)? 
One positive quality of the UNDP evaluation system is that it directly contracts with evaluators rather than 
through private contracting firms in the way that USAID, the European Commission, and others do, in a 
scheme that allows them to exert pressures to falsify and distort evaluations by using the contractors to 
pressure professionals they hire. This means that evaluators control the product and relationship to the 
public. At the same time, the UNDP contract seeks to prevent publication and dissemination of materials 
through a vague standard of what constitutes “private” or “secret” information.  
Thus, the overall impact is debatable. 
0.5 points. 
II. 3.  
 
Evaluation drafts reach the public/budget authority 
for discussion? 
No, they do not. “Stakeholders” are defined by UNDP as the recipient agencies of funds who have a vested 
interest in arguing for receipt of more funds, and these stakeholders are invited to see reports and to try to 
pressure them for changes. At the same time, citizens are excluded from the process and have no way to 
enforce rights or to even know about projects or evaluations. 
0 points. 
II. 4.  
 
There is enforceable information access and 
dissemination protecting beneficiary and evaluator? 
No there is not. There is no judicial body or oversight body that citizens or beneficiaries can use to hold 
UNDP accountable to provide information. They must go to their own governments to challenge bureaucrats 
who they may be unable to hold accountable (often the claim for why UNDP projects are initiated). Requests 
for documents are ignored. Even consultants interviewing for positions as evaluators are usually unable to 
see the project documents or previous evaluations unless they are chosen as evaluators and they may not 
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even be able to get the names or addresses of UNDP staff. Critical evaluations and annexes can be hidden 
even from evaluators, let alone the public. There are almost never open meetings between UNDP officials and 
the public.  
0 points. 
II. 5.  
 
The quality of evaluation reporting is sufficient for 
beneficiaries to use to make judgments on 
comparative value and spending? 
No, there is not, because outcomes are rarely measured or compared. The typical evaluation document is 
used as a justification for future funding or a confirmation of delivery of funds with little question asked 
other than whether someone “received funds” and was therefore “better off.” There are no standards for 
spending comparisons or other types of decisionmaking between alternatives within projects or between 
projects other than “numbers of beneficiaries” and some impact on symptoms. 
0 points. 
II. 6.  
 
There is real, regular and measurable information 
delivery and access? 
No there is not. Visit UNDP sites at the country level or regional or New York offices and you will find few if 




 0.5 points. 
Evaluations are transparent in theory and the public is involved in theory, but the reality is that they only 
rarely see an evaluation or part of one that is critical of UNDP, and even when they do there is little that they 
can do to push UNDP to change any practices. 
Analysis III: Protection of Professionalism and Political Insulation of Evaluations 
Question Indicator Scoring 
III. 1.  
 
Consultant hiring focuses on professional skills? No, it does not focus on skills, though it might include them in a peripheral way. UNDP would say that their 
offices choose specialists on the basis of qualifications, but the selection is almost always done by project 
officers who have minimal training (often little beyond language skills) and focus on personal qualities, 
salary levels, or knowledge of the UNDP system rather than on actual problem-solving skills related to the 
area of work. 
0 points. 
III. 2.  
 
Professional standards of work are protected? No, they are not. UNDP offers a form contract that does not reference professional standards and that does 
not allow it to be included. Contract offers can be rescinded if consultants seek to add protections and 
standards.  
0 points 
III. 3.  
 
Evaluator’s independent judgment is protected 
through evaluator control of the process? 
Determining actual control of the evaluation process is a bit difficult. For most UNDP projects, the partners 
are government officials and access depends on UNDP, itself. UNDP selects project teams as well as 
translators. (By contrast, for EC evaluations, evaluators are to hire their own staff and make their own 
contacts. They have more “control” but no real access or understanding on the ground.) Evaluators select the 
methods and the questions but UNDP translators and project officers and staff can easily exert control over 
evaluations (and do) by reporting back behind the back of evaluators. The amount of money spent for 
evaluations is set by UNDP, often without any rational relation to the size of project or quality of information 
available and without any connection to real time needed for a full evaluation. It is easy to argue that 
evaluators have no control at all over the process, but since there is some debate UNDP gets the benefit of the 
doubt.  
0.5 points. 
III. 4.  
 
Evaluator’s independent judgment and reporting of 
minority and deviant views are protected? 
Yes, it does. This question asks only whether there is pressure exerted on team members of evaluations to 
come to a consensus or whether individuals can submit separate reports and UNDP is unique among most 
international organizations in that it does not allow “team leaders” to force a single viewpoint. Contracts and 
work products are individual. 
1 point 
III. 5.  
 
Evaluations are protected against early termination 
without professional review? 
No, they are not. UNDP offices view their “relationships” with their donors, government agencies and 
implementing partners as more important than tough evaluations and can stop evaluations at any time to 
protect their bureaucratic interests. Evaluators are not considered “staff members” and have none of the 
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whistleblower protections of UNDP staff. There is no professional oversight over this. 
0 points. 
III. 6.  
 
Evaluator payment is insulated from pressures? The typical UNDP evaluation contract conditions payment on acceptance of a written product rather than on 
days worked, even though work is supervised and labor is expected. UNDP also typically asks to see 
evaluations before they are finalized and makes “requests” for changes that can be interpreted as pressures. 
At the same time, there are written regulations assuring evaluators of independence and these are 
incorporated into the contracts and can be upheld, though it is costly to do so.  
0.5 points given that the insulation from pressures are debatable. 
III. 7.  
 
Pre-judicial enforcement of objectivity and standards 
is independent of the implementing agents being 
evaluated? 
No, it is not. UNDP’s “Hotline” that is part of the Office of Audit and Investigations reports directly to the 
UNDP Administrator rather than to member states or the Executive Board, and the members of the office are 
also UNDP employees, belonging to the same union. They are not subject to public or professional oversight 
and have no real incentive to hold the UNDP accountable to its own laws when outside evaluators show they 
have been violated. 
0 points 
III. 8.  
 
There are clear standards of performance and 
rehiring of evaluators is safeguarded through 
whistleblower protections? 
No there is not. If there are records kept on evaluators, they are not public and there is no way to challenge 
them. The only measures of quality are whether project officers and country offices are “happy” since there is 
no professional review of evaluators by any body of equal professional credentials. Blacklisting is easy in the 




 2 points. 
There is weak protection of professionalism that allows strong, independent minded consultants to stick by 
their findings in their reports and being paid for doing so. The cost, however, is that such professionals are 
likely to be blacklisted at least at the country level and must deal with constant pressures and the time/costs 
required during the process of the evaluation. 
Type of Evaluation System I. Functioning Management Control 
System 
II. Transparency ad Accountability 
(Government Watchdog and Public 
Protection) 
III. Professionalism and Political 
Insulation of Evaluations 
Score Summary: A. 0 points out of 4. 
B. 0.5 points out of 7. 
0.5 points out of 6 2 points out of 8 
 Low to Non-existent other than for raising 
and delivering funds 









Final Scoring of UNDP Evaluation System 
 
 SCORING 
Measures Corrupted Evaluation Likely 
Used as a Propaganda and 
Fundraising Tool 
Vulnerable Evaluation Partly Effective Monitoring but 
Potentially Vulnerable 
Evaluation Subject to Influence  
Professional, Accountable 
Evaluation Protecting public 
spending 
I. Functioning Management Control 
System: Utilizing Proper Evaluation 
Roles, Expertise, and Data Collection 
(Weighting of scores of A. and B.) 
At most 0 – 1 point in category A 
or 0 – 2 points in category B 
The evaluation is just for show 
and has no impact. 
At most 1.5 - 2 points in 
category A or 2.5– 4 points in 
category B 
The evaluation system is 
probably driven by an outside 
agenda or co-opted internally. 
At most 2.5 – 3.5 points in 
category A or 4.5 – 6.5 points in 
category B 
A strong system needing only 
some changes 
All 4 points in A and  
All 7 points in B 
A model professional 
management system 
A. Managerial Controls that Apply 
Evaluation Systems to Rewards and 
Punishments: (0 to 4 points) 
0 to 1 point 
An evaluation system that is 
symbolic but that has no 
impact. 
1.5 - 2 points 
An ineffective or vulnerable 
evaluation system 
2.5 – 3.5 points 
A working evaluation system 
that could be more 
professionalized 
All 4 points— 
A model professional 
management system 
B. Quality of Seven Individual 
Oversight Systems that Evaluations 
Monitor  
(0 to 7 points) 
0 – 2 points 
No measurements or systems. 
Evaluation is for show.  
2.5 - 4 points 
Weak organization probably 
driven by an outside agenda or 
run for the bureaucrats and 
friends 
4.5 – 6.5 points – Strong 
management system in most 
areas 
All 7 points –  
A model professional 
management system 
II. Transparency and Accountability of 
the Evaluation, Itself: Watchdog Role  
(0 to 6 points) 
0 – 2 points 
The system is designed for 
bureaucrats to protect their 
interest against the public 
2.5 – 4 points 
There is lip service or 
recognition of public 
protections that sometimes 
work but can be thwarted and 
the public may be fooled by 
what it is able to see 
4.5 – 5.5 points  
The system is open but quality 
and some opinions may still be 
suppressed 
All 6 points – The public receives 
everything and can be assured of 
quality 
III. Protection of Professionalism and 
Political Insulation of Evaluations  
(0 to 8 points) 
0 – 2 points  
No real protections at all 
2.5 – 4 points Professionals will 
have to battle against pressures 
and take considerable risks 
4.5 – 7.5 points Either financial 
pressures or risk of violations of 
professional standards exist 
All 8 points – a model system of 
protection and professionalism 
Total: All columns are the farthest left. 
The overall score can be read in the top 
row.  
Overall: Corrupted Evaluation: Useless or Non-existent Evaluation System, indicative of a system that has been co-opted by bureaucrats, 
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